

## SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad SIT Digital Collections

---

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

SIT Study Abroad


---

Spring 2018

# Church and State in Rwanda: Catholic Missiology and the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi

Marcus Timothy Haworth  
*SIT Study Abroad*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp\\_collection](https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection)

 Part of the [African Languages and Societies Commons](#), [African Studies Commons](#), [Catholic Studies Commons](#), [Ethics in Religion Commons](#), [Missions and World Christianity Commons](#), [Politics and Social Change Commons](#), [Race and Ethnicity Commons](#), [Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons](#), and the [Sociology of Religion Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Haworth, Marcus Timothy, "Church and State in Rwanda: Catholic Missiology and the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi" (2018). *Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection*. 2830.  
[https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp\\_collection/2830](https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2830)

This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please contact [digitalcollections@sit.edu](mailto:digitalcollections@sit.edu).

CHURCH AND STATE IN RWANDA  
CATHOLIC MISSIOLOGY AND THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI

MARCUS TIMOTHY HAWORTH

WORLD LEARNING – SIT STUDY ABROAD

SCHOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAINING

RWANDA: POST-GENOCIDE RESTORATION AND PEACEBUILDING PROGRAM

CELINE MUKAMURENZI, ACADEMIC DIRECTOR

SPRING 2018



## ABSTRACT

During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, over one million Tutsis were killed by the government of Rwanda and Hutu extremists. In this study, I address two questions: (1) did the Church, as an institution, offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? And, (2) what role, if any, did the Church, as an institution, play, in promoting a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, that fostered genocide ideology?

In spring 2018, I conducted six participant interviews about the missiological practices of the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Based on these accounts and other archival written resources, I constructed a general account of the pre-genocidal identity narrative present in the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

I conclude that the Church, as an institution, could have done much more to offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Moreover, the Church, as an institution, did very little to promote a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda. This study offers evidence that supports previous research that the Church, as an institution, was complicit in fostering genocide ideology insofar as it promoted and failed to counter the situational narrative of colonial and post-independent Rwandan Christian identity.



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- [1] *APR/FPR* (RPA/RPF): *Armée Patriotique Rwandais/Front Patriotique Rwandais* (Rwandan Patriotic Army/Rwandan Patriotic Front)
- [2] *CNLG*: *Commision National pour le Lutte contre le Génocide* (National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide)
- [3] *CST*: Catholic Social Teaching
- [4] *MDR/MDR-PARMEHUTU*: *Mouvement de l'Émancipation Hutu/Mouvement Démocratique Republicain-Parmehutu* (Movement of the Hutu Emancipation/Republican Democratic Movement–Parmehutu)
- [5] *MNRD*: *Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development)
- [6] *SIT*: School for International Training
- [7] *THE CHURCH*: The Roman Catholic Church
- [8] *UN*: The United Nations



## DEFINITIONS OF TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS

[1] APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION: A method of communication used by the Pope, the head of the Church, as an institution, in communicating to the laity and clergy so as to encourage the faithful to undertake a certain action or actions. An apostolic exhortation does not define Church doctrine or dogma. A post-synodal apostolic exhortation refers to an apostolic exhortation issued after a synod, or assembly, of bishops.

[2] *ARMÉE PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS/FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS* (RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY/RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT): The ruling political party in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda led by President Paul Kagame since 1994. Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the party was known as the APR (RPA), a group in opposition to the government of Juvénal Habyarimana and the MDR/MDR-PARMEHUTU based in Uganda. In post-genocide Rwanda, the party is known as the FPR (RPF).

[3] *BANYARWANDA*: The cultural and linguistic group of people comprised of those who speak Kinyarwanda and share in its culture, mainly living in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda and Burundi with minority populations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Tanzania.

[4] CHRISTENDOM PHILOSOPHY: According to Antoine Rutayisire, in his dissertation, *Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda* (2015), Christendom philosophy stresses “a kind of Christianity that comes hand in hand with political power, [and is] imposed as a culture rather than embraced as a choice and lifestyle.”<sup>1</sup>

[5] CHURCH GROWTH SCHOOL OF CALIFORNIA: A model of evangelization that focuses on numerical – not social – conversion.

[6] CONSTANTINE MODEL (“TOP-DOWN” PEDAGOGY OF EVANGELIZATION): A model for evangelization that stresses the conversion of the elite as a means for conversion of the masses. In colonial Rwanda this went hand-in-hand with the Hamitic Hypothesis and was translated into the conversion of the Tutsi elite. In post-colonial Rwanda, prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, this was translated into the conversion of the Hutu elite.



[7] DIVIDE-AND-RULE: According to Mahmood Mamdani, in his book, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonial, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (2001), divide-and-rule in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda subordinated (Bantu) Hutus to (Hamite) Tutsis, so as to encourage dissent among the groups and to discourage unified opposition to colonial Belgian rule. Mamdani writes: “The political project of the [Belgian] regime. . . was to fracture a racialized native [*Banyarwanda*] population into different ethnicized groups.”<sup>2</sup>

[8] ENLIGHTENMENT (PHILOSOPHY): An eighteenth century European philosophical movement that advocated for the supremacy of human reason in all spheres of livelihood (e.g., politics, education, etc.). Enlightenment philosophy has heavily impacted the contemporary Western worldview.

[9] EUCHARIST: In the Catholic tradition, the Sacrament in which bread and wine are transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ Jesus and consumed.

[10] EVANGELIZATION: In Christianity, the preaching of the Gospel or the Christian tradition so as to encourage conversion among non-Christians.

[11] *GÉNOCIDAIRES*: The name given to perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Literally translated from the French as: “those who commit genocide.”

[12] GENOCIDE: Resolution 96-I (A/RES/96-I) of the United Nations General Assembly confirmed that, “genocide is a crime under international law” as “the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, ”and that “member states [are] to enact the necessary legislation for the prevention and punishment of the crime.”<sup>3</sup> In 1948, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (A/RES/260) codified that “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial, or religious group as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [or] (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”<sup>4</sup>

[13] GNOSTICISM: A second-century heretical movement in the Church that stressed that matter – the physical universe – was innately evil and that salvation comes through *gnosis* and is accessible only to an educated elite.

[14] HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS/THEORY: According to Peter Safari, in his article, “Church, State, and the Rwandan Genocide” (2010), the Hamitic Hypothesis/Theory involved the racialization of the traditional socio-economic identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa into Bantu and Hamitic identities.<sup>5</sup> Mamdani notes that the pretext for the colonial civilizing mission in Rwanda lay in the Hamitic Hypothesis, the notion that every sign of “progress” in Africa was to be attributed to “Caucasians who were black in color without being Negroid in race” (the Hamites) and who were separate from the Bantu, the “so-called real Africans.”<sup>6</sup>

[15] HUTU REVOLUTION: A 1959 social revolution in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda based on *a La Note sur l'Aspect Social du Problème Racial Indigène au Rwanda/Le Manifeste des Bahutu* (The Note on the Social Aspect of the Indigenous Racial Problem in Rwanda/The *Bahutu* Manifesto) that advocated for and advanced a Hutu majority government and subsequently led to the rise of Hutu nationalism.

[16] IDENTITY POLITICS: The formation of strategic political alliances based on the tendency for people to either group themselves based on (perceived) shared characteristics (e.g., Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) or to align themselves with a specific group (e.g., from 1900 to the 1950s, the Church aligned itself with the Tutsi elite and, from the 1950s to 1994, the Church aligned itself with the Hutu elite).

[17] *IMANA*: The traditional Kinyarwanda word for God in *Banyarwanda* culture.

[18] *INDATWA*: The name given to Tutsi elites produced by missionary schools. Literally translated from the Kinyarwanda as “the elite.”<sup>7</sup>

[19] *INTERAHAMWE*: An extremist Hutu civilian militant group trained and equipped by the pre-genocide government of Rwanda’s army to help in the execution of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

[20] *INYENZI*: The name given to Tutsis during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi by government officials, the pro-genocide media, and Hutu extremists. Literally translated from the Kinyarwanda as “cockroaches.”

[21] JUDGMENTAL SAMPLING: A research method in which “the primary consideration is [the researcher’s] judgement as to who can provide the best information to achieve the objectives of [the] study.”<sup>8</sup>

[22] *LE MOUVEMENT RÉPUBLICAIN NATIONAL POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT* (THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT): The ruling political party founded and led by Juvénal Habyarimana in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda from 1975 to 1994. It was characterized by Hutu nationalism and often referred to as MNRD.

[23] *LA NOTE SUR L'ASPECT SOCIAL DU PROBLÈME RACIAL INDIGÈNE AU RWANDA/LE MANIFESTE DES BAHUTU* (NOTE ON THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF THE INDIGENOUS RACIAL PROBLEM IN RWANDA/THE BAHUTU MANIFESTO): A 1957 document written by Hutu intellectuals under the guidance of members of the Church’s clergy calling for the liberation of Hutus from both Tutsis and European colonists.

[24] *LE PARTI DU MOUVEMENT DE L'ÉMANCIPATION HUTU/LE MOUVEMENT DÉMOCRATIQUE RÉPUBLICAIN – PARMEHUTU* (THE MOVEMENT OF THE HUTU EMANCIPATION/THE REPUBLICAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT-PARMEHUTU): The ruling political party founded and led by Grégoire Kayibanda in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda from 1957 to 1973. It was characterized by Hutu nationalism and often referred to as MDR/MDR- PARMEHUTU.

[25] *LE PÈRES BLANCS* (THE WHITE FATHERS): A Catholic religious order, officially known as the Missionaries of Africa, that was largely responsible for the evangelization of the African continent.

[26] MIGRATION HYPOTHESIS: The notion that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa came to the present-day nation-state of Rwanda from different geographical regions at different times in history. This hypothesis was used in conjunction with the Hamitic Hypothesis/Theory to justify colonial identity politics.

[27] MISSIOLOGY: In Christianity, the study of missions and their methods of catechesis or religious education. In this study, missiology refers to the messages promulgated, the attitudes held, and the actions taken by the Church, as an institution.

[28] NATION-STATE: A form of political organization in which citizens are united by a common factor, or factors, such as language, culture, or ethnicity.

[29] QUOTA SAMPLING: A research method in which the main consideration is “the researcher’s ease of access to the sample population. . . guided by some visible characteristic, such as gender or race, of the study population that is of interest to [the researcher]. . . [until] the required number of respondents” is reached.<sup>9</sup>

[30] POLITICS OF EQUILIBRIUM: To address “Hutu grievances and [the] desire for emancipation,” in 1959, “with the blessing of Chanoine Ernotte and Father Endriatis,” Grégoire Kayibanda established *Le Parti du Mouvement de l’Émancipation Hutu* (The Party of Movement of the Hutu Emancipation) or *Le Mouvement Démocratique Republicain – Parmehutu* (The Republican Democratic Movement – Parmehutu), commonly referred to as MDR-PARMEHUTU, with the aim of defending a “‘politics of equilibrium,’ through which jobs and positions were divided according to the percentage of Hutu (85%) and Tutsi (15%)” in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda.<sup>10</sup>

[31] POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGY (NARRATIVE THEOLOGY): A movement in theology that stresses the use of a narrative approach. It gives primacy to the Biblical narrative, while rejecting both conservative and liberal methods of theological inquiry.

[32] SIN OF OMISSION: In the Catholic tradition, a failure to act on what one ought to do.

[33] SITUATIONIST PERSPECTIVE: A sociological method that “assess[es] how historical, political, and cultural structures insinuate a response, or lack of a response, on the part of an individual.”<sup>11</sup>

[34] SNOWBALL SAMPLING: A research method in which “a few individuals in a group or organization are selected and the required information is collected from them. They are then asked to identify other people in the group or organization, and the people selected by them become a part of the sample.”<sup>12</sup>

[35] STRATIFIED RANDOM SAMPLING: A research method in which “the researcher attempts to stratify the population in such a way that the population within a stratum is homogeneous with respect to the characteristic on the basis of which it is being stratified.”<sup>13</sup>

[36] SOCIAL IMAGINATION: Charles Wright Mills, in his book, *The Sociological Imagination*, defines the “social imagination” as “the awareness of the relationship between personal experience and the wider society.”<sup>14</sup>

[37] THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI IN RWANDA: Under resolution L.31 (A/72/L.31), the United Nations’ General Assembly adopted the phrase “the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda” as the official historical title for the events of 1994 in Rwanda, replacing the previous verbiage of resolution 58/234 (A/RES/58/234) which posited the title as: “the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.”<sup>15</sup>

[38] THE GREAT COMMISSION: The name given to Matthew 28:16-20 in which Jesus tells his disciples to spread His teaching to all the nations of the world.

[39] THE *MWAMI*: The traditional Kinyarwanda word for king in *Banyarwanda* culture.

[40] THE *XAVERI* FORMULA: A Catholic youth organization founded in the 1950s that played a crucial role in the social and cultural education of Hutu youth.

[41] TRIBALISM: In his article, “Christianity, Tribalism, and the Rwandan Genocide: A Catholic Reassessment of Christian ‘Social Responsibility,’” Emmanuel Katongole defines “tribalism” as constructed “political identities” rooted in distinct, rigidly separated racialized ethnic groups.<sup>16</sup>

[42] TWO-TIERED EDUCATION SYSTEM: Under European colonial rule, the Church propagated an education system in which Tutsis received a higher quality of education, both in content and rigor, than Hutus. In the pre-genocide independent nation-state of Rwanda, Church “favoritism” flipped and Hutus received a higher quality of education, both in content and rigor, than Tutsis.

[43] *UBUHAKE*: A Kinyarwanda word used to express patron-client relationships prior to and during the colonial period.

[44] *UBURETWA*: A Kinyarwanda word for forced labor policies prior to and during the colonial period.

[45] VICAR APOSTOLIC: In the Catholic tradition, the name given to the head of an apostolic vicariate, a juridical region centered on a geographic mission.

[46] *ZONE TAMPONE*: The French word used to refer to the demilitarized zone between the Rwandese Patriotic Army and the pre-genocide government of the present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Literally, Temporary Zone in English.



CHURCH AND STATE IN RWANDA  
CATHOLIC MISSIOLOGY AND THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI

MARCUS TIMOTHY HAWORTH

SCHOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAINING



SCIENTIFIC DOMAINS:

AFRICAN STUDIES; CATHOLIC STUDIES; CHURCH AND STATE; CLERGY;  
CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION; ETHNICITY; GENOCIDE STUDIES;  
HISTORY OF RWANDA; HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN RWANDA;  
MISSIOLOGY; POLITICAL SCIENCE; PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION; PEACE  
AND JUSTICE; POLITICAL THEOLOGY; POSTLIBERALISM THEOLOGY;  
RELIGION; RELIGIOUS EDUCATION; SOCIOLOGY; SOCIOLOGY OF  
EDUCATION; THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI





*FOR POSTCOLONIAL-STATISM IN POLICY AND RHETORIC HAS PREFERRED  
TO TALK DOWN “ETHNIC SURVIVALS” LIKE THE SONINKE — EVERY  
READER MAY SUPPLY HIS OR HER OWN EXAMPLE FROM A HOST OF  
CANDIDATES— AS DEPOLORABLY ILLEGITIMATE AND BEST FORGOTTEN,  
BECAUSE, NOT HAVING FORMED NATION-STATES AND THEREFORE NOT  
BEING ADMITTED TO BE NATIONS, THEY HAVE NO RIGHT OR REASON TO  
REMAIN ALIVE.<sup>17</sup>*

BASIL DAVIDSON



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to the School for International Training's (SIT) "Rwanda: Post Genocide Restoration and Peacebuilding" program staff and guest lecturers, with special thanks to Celine Mukamurenzi, academic director, Sunday Justin Nzitatira, office manager, and Mercy Atuhurira, program and student services coordinator.

I wish to acknowledge the help, advice, and proofreading provided by Professor Paul Rutayisire, my Independent Study Project (ISP) advisor. You have read my paper with an eye for detail and made me aware of mistakes in the literature and historical development of Christianity in Rwanda.

I would additionally like to offer my special thanks to all those who agreed to participate in this study, committing their time to sharing their personal stories and experiences. In a special way, I would like to thank my translators for their willingness to assist me in overcoming the language barrier.

Furthermore, I am particularly grateful for the time spent with my host family. You have made my time in Rwanda memorable. I love you like my own family and I hope to be back to see you soon. I will miss you while I am gone.

Additionally, I would like to acknowledge my fellow students, especially those whom I stayed with during the ISP-internship period. I am grateful for all of the wonderful discussions we've had together, even the ones that resulted in disagreement. I have learned much from all of you and sincerely wish you the best in your future endeavors. I know you will all do amazing things with whatever you do in your lives.

I would like to extend special thanks to all of those at the University of Notre Dame who encouraged me to apply to this program, pushed me to go, and peaked my interest in African Christianity and spirituality.

Finally, I would also like to thank my parents for allowing me to spend a semester abroad in Rwanda. I know the distance has been hard at times. I love you and cannot wait to see you soon. I have many stories and experiences to share with you.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	v
DEFINITIONS OF TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xxi
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY	
1.1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY	3
1.2: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY	5
1.3: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND SIGNIFICANCE	7
1.4: OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY	8
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	
2.1: SCOPE OF THE STUDY	9
2.2: DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES	9
2.3: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	10
2.4: LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY	10
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW	
3.1: OVERVIEW	12
3.2: NARRATIVE THEOLOGY AND THE “SOCIAL IMAGINATION”	12
3.3: PRE-COLONIALISM: CULTURE AND RELIGION IN RWANDA	14
3.4: THE CHURCH AND THE COLONIAL NARRATIVE	15
3.5: THE 1959 “HUTU REVOLUTION,” INDEPENDENCE, AND NATIONALISM	18
3.6: POST-COLONIALISM: THE CHURCH AND THE NATION-STATE	20
3.7: THE CHURCH ACCUSED: SILENCE AND COMPLICITY	22
CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA	
4.1: DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW	24
4.2: PARTICIPANT INTRODUCTION TO, EDUCATION IN, AND DESCRIPTION OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH PRIOR TO THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI	24
4.3: THE CHURCH AND MISSIOLOGY	26



4.4: CLERGY AND THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI	26
4.5: PARTICIPANT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CHURCH'S MISSIOLOGICAL PRACTICES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI	27
4.6: PARTICIPANT IDENTITY: THE CHURCH AND THE NATION-STATE	29
4.7: THE IMPACT OF THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST TUTSI ON PARTICIPANTS' FAITH	30
CHAPTER 5: INTERPRETATION OF DATA	
5.1: INTRODUCTION	31
5.2: THE MESSAGES PROMULGATED BY THE CHURCH PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI	32
5.3: THE ATTITUDES HELD BY THE CHURCH PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI	34
5.4: THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CHURCH PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI	36
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION	
6.1: CONCLUSION	39
6.2: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	41
NOTES	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY	61
APPENDICES	
A	65
B	68
C	69





CHURCH AND STATE IN RWANDA  
CATHOLIC MISSIOLOGY AND THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI

MARCUS TIMOTHY HAWORTH

SCHOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAINING



## General Introduction and Background to the Study

*Are you saying that the blood of tribalism is deeper than the waters of baptism?*<sup>18</sup>

Cardinal Roger Etchegaray

### *1.1: General Introduction to the Study*

During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, over one million Tutsis were killed by the government of Rwanda and Hutu extremists, namely the *interahamwe*, a civilian militant group trained and equipped by the pre-genocide government of Rwanda's army.<sup>19</sup> It is estimated that in 1994 as many as 90 percent of the Rwandan population was Christian with 62.6 percent identifying as Catholic, 18.8 percent identifying as Protestant, and 8.4 percent identifying as Seventh Day Adventist.<sup>20</sup> According to African Rights, “more Rwandese died in churches and parishes than anywhere else” during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.<sup>21</sup> In one of the most heavily Christianized nations in Africa, where was the Church during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda?<sup>22</sup> In what ways, if any, did the Church, as an institution, contribute to or fail to address the factors that led to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda?

In 1884, the first German colonist Count Gustav Adolf von Götzen set foot in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda. By 1896, Germany had seized control and had become the dominant colonial power in the present-day nation-states of Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania, with smaller holdings in both Kenya and Mozambique (this territory was collectively referred to as German East Africa). In his article, “Church, State, and the Rwandan Genocide” (2010), Peter Safari notes that the German colonists “interpreted the socio-political structure and history of the kingdom [of Rwanda] through a pseudo-scientific ‘hamitic theory,’” which posited the traditional socio-economic identities of Hutu and Tutsi as racialized ethnic identities.<sup>23</sup> According to Mahmood Mamdani's book, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (2001), the ethnic racialization of traditional Hutu and Tutsi socio-economic identities was a historical process, produced and undergirded by the political institutionalization of colonial rule.<sup>24</sup>

For Mamdani, the Belgian invasion of German East Africa in 1916 and the subsequent inception of Belgian colonial rule in Rwanda in 1918 catalyzed the process of ethnic racialization in Rwanda. Mamdani states: “It took Belgian rule a little over a decade to translate its vision of a civilizational mission in Rwanda into an institutional imprint.”<sup>25</sup> Here, Mamdani notes that the pretext for the colonial civilizing mission in Rwanda lay in the Hamitic Hypothesis, the notion that every sign of “progress” in Africa was to be attributed to “Caucasians who were black in color without being Negroid in race” (the Hamites) and who were separate from the Bantu, the “so-called real Africans.”<sup>26</sup> That is, “progress” was thought of as a direct result of Hamitic descent from European (Caucasian) lineage and, thus, European colonization was justified as the continuation of Hamitic “progress,” albeit in a perfected form.

In Rwanda, colonial Belgian rule translated the Hamitic Hypothesis into systematic divide-and-rule policy, subordinating (Bantu) Hutus to (Hamite) Tutsis, so as to encourage dissent among the groups and to discourage unified opposition to colonial Belgian rule. Mamdani writes: “The political project of the [Belgian] regime. . . was to fracture a racialized native [*Banyarwanda*] population into different ethnicized groups.”<sup>27</sup> Belgian colonial law thus enfranchised and empowered (Hamite) Tutsis at the expense of (Bantu) Hutus who, consequently, were disenfranchised and disempowered. Here, Mamdani notes: “As representation, race was vertical but ethnicity [was] horizontal”; that is, Belgian colonial rule ordered society hierarchically: first, between white European colonists and *Banyarwanda* and, second, between Hutus and Tutsis who, although ethnically identical (*Banyarwanda*), were racially unequal.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, Belgian divide-and-rule policy was institutionally implemented through Tutsi favoritism in employment and education. According to Andy Story, in his article, “Structural Violence and the Struggle for State Power in Rwanda: What Arusha Got Wrong” (2012), Tutsis were “systematically favored” and, consequently, attained characteristics of a “political elite” and a “superior ‘race’” under Belgian colonial rule.<sup>29</sup>

At the time of colonial independence in 1962, Mamdani notes that Rwanda was an institutionally and ethnically divided state. He writes: “The political legacy of indirect-rule colonialism in Africa was a bifurcated state: civic[ally] and ethnic[ally]” entrenched in institutionally racialized ethnic discrimination.<sup>30</sup> This bifurcated state continued under the post-independent presidencies of Grégoire Kayibanda (the First Republic, 1962–1973) and Juvénal Habyarimana (the

Second Republic, 1973–1994) and resulted in numerous Hutu–Tutsi conflicts, culminating in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

Here, one can ask the following questions: Did the Church, as an institution, offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? Moreover, what role, if any, did the Church, as an institution, play in promoting a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, that fostered genocide ideology?<sup>31</sup>

### *1.2: Background to the Study*

In 1946, resolution 96-I (A/RES/96-I) of the United Nations General Assembly confirmed that, “genocide is a crime under international law” as “the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups,” and that “member states [are] to enact the necessary legislation for the prevention and punishment of the crime.”<sup>32</sup> In 1948, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (A/RES/260) codified that “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial, or religious group as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [or] (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group,” and that “the following acts shall be punishable: (a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to commit genocide; [and] (e) complicity in genocide.”<sup>33</sup>

In 1899, under the direction of Monsignor Jean-Joseph Hirth (1854–1931), the Roman Catholic Vicar Apostolic of Nyanza between 1894 and 1912, *Le Pères Blancs* (or, the Missionaries of Africa, commonly referred to as the White Fathers) entered the present-day nation-state of Rwanda.<sup>34</sup> In his article, “The Churches and the Genocide in Rwanda” (1997), Gerrard van ‘t Spijker posits that Rwanda “fulfilled the dreams of the White Fathers’ founder Cardinal Charles Martial Allemand-Lavigérie (1825–1892): a strong kingdom with one culture and one language, thus far never touched by Western cultures.”<sup>35</sup> In his dissertation, *Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda* (2015), Antoine Rutayisire states that: “Cardinal



[Allemand-]Lavigérie founded his missionary strategy on the Constantine model that stipulates that when you convert the leadership, they will bring you the mass[es].”<sup>36</sup> That is, for Allemand-Lavigérie, Christian evangelization meant, first, the conversion of the ruling class and, second, the conversion of the general population.<sup>37</sup> Although this was the case, from 1899–1930, Safari notes that evangelization in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda was “slow and difficult because the king [Yuhi Musinga] and the aristocracy resisted conversion.”<sup>38</sup>

In 1931, however, under the leadership of Monsignor Léon-Paul Classe (1874–1945), Vicar Apostolic of Rwanda between 1922 and 1945, *Le Pères Blancs* converted and, in 1943, baptized King Mutara III Rudahigwa.<sup>39</sup> King Mutara’s conversion and baptism, notes Rutayisire, stemmed from being “trained in the first colonial administration school.”<sup>40</sup> Like Allemand-Lavigérie, Classe embraced a “top-down conversion” pedagogy rooted in missionary education.<sup>41</sup> Tharcisse Gatwa, in his article, “Mission and Belgian Colonial Anthropology in Rwanda. Why the Churches Stood Accused in the 1994 Tragedy? What Next?” (2000), writes: “For Mgr. Classe, the aim of these schools was to form a social elite ‘capable of understanding and implementing change.’”<sup>42</sup>

Like secular colonial European rule, the Church embraced the “contemporary conceptions of race and nationality that viewed the world’s population as divided into neatly defined, hierarchically ranked groups with specific innate characteristics.”<sup>43</sup> Thus, Classe’s “top-down” pedagogy, like Allemand-Lavigérie’s, was deeply seeded in the myth of the Hamitic Hypothesis: “Both missionary schools and catechumenate have been factors used to shape a model of society based on Hamite supremacy. . . These schools produced an elite who came to be known as *indatwa* (the elected) who played an influential role in the country.”<sup>44</sup> For Gatwa, the conversion and baptism of King Mutara can be explained insofar as “the old guard chiefs were dismissed, and young literate missionary educated men (*Batutsi*) were appointed.”<sup>45</sup>

In 1946, King Mutara dedicated the present-day nation-state of Rwanda to Christ the King, solidifying the integration of church and state.<sup>46</sup> Rutayisire notes: “The banishment of the former king [Yuhi Musinga] had sent the signal to all the chiefs and notables of land that power had changed hands, and many of them in a very opportunistic move decided to toe the line and got baptized.”<sup>47</sup> Christendom philosophy henceforth became heavily ingrained in the politics of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda between 1962 and 1994: one could not understand the Church without understanding the state, yet one could not understand the state without understanding the Church.

In his essay, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators” (2004), Philip G. Zimbardo argues that situational conditions must be considered in “the transformation of good people into perpetrators of evil,” not merely locating evil within “individual predispositions.”<sup>48</sup> For Zimbardo, a “situationist perspective propels external determinants of behavior to the foreground” so as to assess how historical, political, and cultural structures insinuate a response, or lack of a response, on the part of an individual.<sup>49</sup> That is, acts of evil are resultant of both situational conditions and individual agency.

In this study, I posit that the Church, as an institution, could have done much more to offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Moreover, the Church, as an institution, did very little to promote a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda. Thus, I conclude that the Church, as an institution, was complicit in fostering genocide ideology insofar as it promoted and failed to counter the situational narrative of colonial and post-independent Rwandan Christian identity. To quote Jean Ndurimana, there was a “*crise d’autorité et absence de discernment*” (“a crisis of authority and an absence of discernment,” my translation) within the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.<sup>50</sup> The Church was “*malheureux les silencieux*” (“unfortunately the silent ones,” my translation).<sup>51</sup>

### *1.3: Research Problem and Significance*

Catholic Social Teaching (CST) stresses the dignity of the human person in the context of relationships (i.e., within community). During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, this fundamental teaching was violated as Tutsi's were dehumanized as *inyenzi* (cockroaches).<sup>52</sup>

In this study, I addressed two questions: (1) did the Church, as an institution, offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? And, (2) what role, if any, did the Church, as an institution, play, in promoting a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, that fostered genocide ideology?

The questions posed by this study are all significant to future efforts for peace and justice in Rwanda, where a large percentage of the population remains Catholic and is socially and politically influenced by its teachings.

#### *1.4: Objective of the Study*

The objective of this study was to construct a general account of the pre-genocidal identity narrative present in the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

Through an assessment of Church missiology (i.e., messages, attitudes, and actions taken by the institutional Church) prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, this research was designed to:

- [1] understand the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi,
- [2] comprehend the impact of the “social imagination” of the Church, as an institution, on the situational narrative of Rwandan Catholics prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, and
- [3] map the ways in which the Church, as an institution, influenced or adhered to the political climate prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

## Research Methodology

### *2.1: Scope of the Study*

This study addressed two questions: (1) did the Church, as an institution, offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? And, (2) what role, if any, did the Church, as an institution, play in promoting a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, that fostered genocide ideology?

The sample size of this study was six participants between the ages of forty and sixty, four of whom were male, and two of whom were female. All participants identified as Catholic prior to, during, or in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It should be noted, however, that not all participants were born in Rwanda nor presently identify as Catholic. Some, for example, were born in Uganda or presently identify as Anglican, while others identify as non-institutional, or cultural, Catholics.

Data were collected and analyzed between 15 April and 12 May 2018.

### *2.2: Data Collection Techniques*

The research methodology used for this study was mixed sampling based on stratified random sampling and non-random sampling techniques, including quota sampling, judgmental sampling, and snowball sampling through participant interviews on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Stratified random sampling focused on the random diversification of sample participants while maintaining homogeneity with respect to Catholic identification prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Quota sampling was engaged insofar as the sample participants presently live in Kigali (five participants) or Butare (one participant), Rwanda. Homogeneity was maintained with respect to participant identification as Catholic prior to, during, or in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

Judgmental sampling was used insofar as initial leads on potential participants were garnered through recommendations from staff at the School for International Training (SIT) in Rwanda and online. Last, snowball sampling was used for post-interview networking with the participant. One or two participants can be attributed to the snowball sampling technique.

In addition to participant interviews, scholarly writings and archival research were consulted. These documents were reviewed and synthesized prior to conducting interviews to help inform the development of an interview protocol (see “Appendix A” for a list of sample interview questions).

Participant interviews were conducted using a semi-structured format to limit interviewee intimidation and to promote a casual, free-speaking environment. Most participant interviews were conducted in English, although one was done entirely in Kinyarwanda via the aid of a translator.

Interviewees were assured that the information collected during the interview process would remain anonymous so as to limit the risk of disclosing personal identifiers. Interviewees had the option to have their interview recorded and the rights of the interviewee were respected for those who did not consent to this form of data collection.

### *2.3: Ethical Considerations*

The ethical considerations germane to this study focused primarily on conducting interviews in a post-genocide context. Such considerations included: overcoming the feeling of “genocide business” (e.g., exploitation of the interviewee by the interviewer), the objectivity of the interviewee and interviewer, and being conscious of the psychological burden of discussing the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Each consideration was addressed through my conscious awareness of the role of a scholar: to act not as an activist, journalist, nor prosecutor; through the promotion of open dialogue and the invitation to hear differing perspectives, not advocating for one line of thought or promoting an agenda by “fishing” for answers through biased or leading questions; by doing my best to “read-between-the-lines, being able to differentiate the subjective personal from the objective facts of the discussion; and by providing appropriate emotional responses to personal stories brought up by the interviewee.

### *2.4: Limitations to the Study*

This exploratory study was primarily limited by the size of sample population and time constraints. Six participant interviewees limited the accuracy of this study in presenting a general account of the pre-genocidal identity narrative present in the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Similarly, time constraints limited the number of participant interviewees that could be reached as well as the amount of scholarly writing and archival research that could be read.

Language issues and participant hesitancy also limited this research. In terms of language, translations were often conducted in a manner in which general concepts were relayed rather than direct phrases, although some dialogue was directly translated when clarification was requested. Participant hesitancy also posed a limitation insofar as possible participants – namely clergy – were unwilling to undergo the interview process, either directing me to a higher authority to interview (e.g., a bishop) or choosing not to respond to my invitation to be interviewed.

## Literature Review

*They saw themselves in any case as the agents of Christian civilization in an Africa sorely in need, as though they knew from their own experience, of every form of salvation.*<sup>53</sup>

Basil Davidson

### *3.1: Overview*

The involvement of the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda has been largely researched from three perspectives: (1) the influence of colonial ideology (notably the Hamitic Hypothesis) on Church “favoritism” prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda; (2) the politicization of the Church via the rise of the nation-state, and the subsequent inability of the Church to paradigmatically detach itself from the nation-state; and (3) the failure of the Church to speak out or take action against genocide ideology prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

This literature review is divided into six sections: (1) narrative theology and the “social imagination;” (2) pre-colonialism: culture and religion in Rwanda; (3) the Church and the colonial narrative; (4) the 1959 “Hutu Revolution,” independence and nationalism; (5) post-colonialism: the Church and the nation-state; and (6) the Church accused: silence and complicity.

### *3.2: Narrative Theology and the “Social Imagination”*

In his book, *Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda* (2009), Emmanuel Katongole states that “our identities are never simple reflections,” for “all identities are formed over time and shaped by the stories we live into.”<sup>54</sup> Likewise, the identity of the Church, as an institution, is rooted in the stories it lives into – the stories it profligates and proliferates. What stories was the Church, in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda, founded on? How did these stories directly shape the messages, attitudes, and actions that

the Church was promoting, or failed to promote, in Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi?

Postliberal, or narrative, theology stresses the “primacy of scriptural narrative for theolog[ical]” understanding.<sup>55</sup> In his article, “The Origins of Postliberalism: A Third Way in Theology?” (2001), Gary Dorrien states that Hans Wilhelm Frei, a twentieth century biblical scholar and theologian, “observed that modern conservative and liberal approaches to the Bible both undermine the authority of Scripture by locating the meaning of the biblical teaching in some doctrine or worldview that is held to be more foundational than Scripture itself. . . [And] that during the Enlightenment this sense of Scripture as realistic narrative was lost.”<sup>56</sup> For Frei, Biblical “interpretation was a matter of fitting the biblical story into another world with another story rather than incorporating the world into the biblical story.”<sup>57</sup> Biblical narrative, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, thus became “increasingly alien to the Church” and “decipherable only to an academic elite” as the dominant analytic (conservative) and experiential (liberal) theological paradigms took root.<sup>58</sup> Biblical narrative was therefore subjected to the reality of the world “with the loss of Scripture as the grand formative narrative.”<sup>59</sup>

In her article, “Storied Identities: Identity Formation and Life Story” (2014), Rosemary Rich states: “work in social psychology has led to the emergence of another pattern of thought concerning identity: that of ‘storied’ identities. This recognizes the central place of self-narrative in the process of identity formation” and suggests that “individuals construct continuous, ever changing narratives to produce coherent narratives of self.”<sup>60</sup> For Rich, a “storied identity” accounts for “the social nature of identity, yet [it] recognizes that an individual has an active role in the construction of their own identity.”<sup>61</sup>

Likewise, Philip G. Zimbardo, in his essay, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators” (2004), argues that situational conditions must be considered in “the transformation of good people into perpetrators of evil,” not merely locating evil within “individual predispositions.”<sup>62</sup> For Zimbardo, a “situationist perspective propels external determinants of behavior to the foreground” so as to assess how historical, political, and cultural structures insinuate a response, or lack of a response, on the part of an individual.<sup>63</sup> That is, acts of evil are resultant of both situational conditions and individual agency.

Both Rich and Zimbardo understand that an individual’s identity is rooted in his or her understanding of the social landscape, reflected in the dominant



narratives present in his or her personal stories, the social identity promulgated by the situational forces he or she was exposed to, and the way(s) in which he or she exercised his or her individual agency in various situations.<sup>64</sup>

In his article, “Violence and Social Imagination: Rethinking Theology and Politics in Africa” (2005b), Emmanuel Katongole suggests that: “[The] way forward [in African theological thought] will involve a critical look at the history of the continent which Christianity has either simply assumed and/or unwittingly underwritten, thereby limiting her own resources for naming, let alone confronting and providing *an alternative to the story of violence and dispossession on the continent*” (my emphasis).<sup>65</sup> Here, Katongole recognizes that in order to construct a general account of theological crises on the African continent – such as the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda – an identity narrative present in the Church prior to and during the crisis must be considered, for individual agency is constructed via narrative (both personally and socially, or situationally). Thus, the intersection of narrative theology and the Church, as an institution, must be at the forefront of any discussion on the theological crisis surrounding an individual’s identity.

### *3.3: Pre-Colonialism: Culture and Religion in Rwanda*

Prior to the arrival of German colonists in 1884 and the advent of Christian missionaries in 1899, “the Rwandan kingdom was built on a rich ideology contained in [the] myths and oral traditions of the ruling royal court.”<sup>66</sup> In his article, “God in the Public Domain: Life Giver, Protector, or Indifferent Sleeper during the Rwandan Tragedies” (2014), Tharcisse Gatwa states: “Myth [was] strongly attached to power control.”<sup>67</sup> Under Kings Ruganzu II Ndoli (1510–1543) and Mibambwe III Sentabyo (1741–1746), God’s presence in the public domain became associated with the “sacralization,” or “divinization,” of the royal court and the Tutsi king, the *mwami*.<sup>68</sup> Gatwa suggests that the “king was believed to be born with seeds in his hands, given by God.”<sup>69</sup>

In addition to the practice of monarchal divinization, Gatwa states that Bernardin Muzungu, in his book, *Le Dieu de nos Pères (God of Our Fathers)* (1974), contends that “God’s presence [was] imbued [in] the Rwandan daily socio-cultural life” in pre-Christian Rwandan society in three ways: (1) “the way of revelation,” (2) “the way of philosophical speculation,” and (3) “the existential life way.”<sup>70</sup>

For Gatwa, “The way of revelation” impacted the daily socio-cultural life of Rwandans insofar as it speculated about “the origins of human beings. . . and

God's relations with humans.”<sup>71</sup> For example, Gatwa notes that “Bahutu, Batutsi, and Batwa were mythically regarded as descendants of Gihanga (the mythical founding father of Rwanda), the sons of the same father, Kanyarwanda; hence they would not harm each other.”<sup>72</sup> Here, Gatwa suggests that proverbs such as “*iyu ucumuye Imana igucira ubugeri* (when you sin God shortens your life)” and “*Imana yerekeza umugome aho intorezo iri* (God sends the murder[er] towards the trap)” reinforced this notion of non-violence, for “before God everyone [was] accountable” in traditional Rwandan society.<sup>73</sup>

“The way of philosophical speculation” and “the existential life” complimented “the way of revelation” insofar as philosophical speculation “succeeded in proving that our [human] experience needs a *raison d'être* beyond any human reach” and “the existential life” harnessed the view that the human being discovers him or herself “as a special creature, a partner of God and a participant to his or her divine nature.”<sup>74</sup>

Upon the arrival of *Le Pères Blancs* in 1899, the process of eradicating traditional religious conceptions of God and Christianizing the present-day nation-state of Rwanda began. Gatwa states: “The dream of Cardinal Lavigerie. . . [was to create a] ‘Christian Kingdom in Central Africa.’”<sup>75</sup> Because of this, “Christian pedagogy made a huge attempt to eradicate all practices of Rwanda[n] culture and religion. . . trampling on [the possibility of] a fruitful interaction between Christianity and traditional religion.”<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, this Christian pedagogy was sociologically and religiously detached from traditional Rwandan understandings of God and, subsequently, socio-religious practices. Gatwa posits that “Christian conversions in Rwanda and Burundi were. . . alien,” wiping away “the traditional conceptions of God” through “the deliberate evacuation of *Imana* in the imagina[tion] of Banyarwanda-Barundi” culture.<sup>77</sup> For Gatwa, it was as if “the Whites presented God to Africa as if the latter never knew Him before.”<sup>78</sup>

### 3.4: *The Church and the Colonial Narrative*

In his book, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (2001), Mahmood Mamdani argues that “the Rwandan genocide needs to be understood as a natives’ genocide. . . a genocide by those who saw themselves as sons – and daughters – of the soil, and their mission as one of clearing the soil of a threatening *alien* presence” (author’s emphasis).<sup>79</sup> Mamdani suggests that, during Belgian colonialization (1916–1962), the traditional socio-economic identities of Hutu and Tutsi became racially charged; that is, Hutu and Tutsi became binary identities circumscribed in legal political

institutions through the colonial enforcement of “divide-and-rule” policy – a form of systematic political favoritism based on racialized ethnic identities. Mamdani writes: “To understand how ‘tribe’ and ‘race’ – like ‘caste’ – got animated as political identities, we need to look at how the law breathed political life into them,” specifically how the law “enfranchised and empowered as citizens the minority it identified as civilized [the Tutsi], and at the same time disempowered and disenfranchised the majority it identified as yet-to-be-civilized [the Hutu]” through employment, education, and access to other government services.<sup>80</sup>

In his article, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda” (2001), Timothy Longman states: “If we accept Harold Lasswell’s (1936) classic definition of politics as the struggle over ‘who gets what, when, [and] how,’ then churches in Rwanda are clearly political institutions, because they play[ed] a major role in distributing resources.”<sup>81</sup> That is, the Church aided in defining “how the law breathed political life into” the colonial identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. For Longman, “Christian churches were thus established during the colonial period [in Rwanda] not simply as allies of the government but as important players in [the] contestation for state power.”<sup>82</sup> Here, two facets of the “meta-narrative” in which the colonial Church positioned itself must be considered: (1) the propagation of the Hamitic Hypothesis and (2) the implementation and the implications of “divide-and-rule” policy.<sup>83</sup>

In 1863, John Hanning Speke, a colonial explorer of the Great Lakes Region of East Africa, wrote in his book, *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*: “It appears impossible to believe, judging from the physical appearance of the Wahuma, that they can be of any other race than semin-Shem-Hamitic of Ethiopia. . . [descendants of] Christians of the greatest antiquity.”<sup>84</sup> Moreover, Speke noted that Tutsis were both “carriers” and “conquerors” of a superior Hamitic race: Tutsi were “‘Caucasians in black skin.’”<sup>85</sup> Similarly, in 1930, Charles Gabriel Seligman, the chair of Ethnology at the London School of Economics (1913–1934), published his book, *Races of Africa*, in which he argued that “the Hamites, whom he considered to be of Caucasian and Semitic origin, were the ‘great civilizing force of Black Africa.’”<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, Seligman stated: “No doubt it is at least in part due to this Caucasian influence that we find the curious mixture of primitive and advanced elements in the social institution of the interlacustrine communities.”<sup>87</sup> By 1933, Katongole notes that the colonial Belgian government had cemented this undergirding thesis of the Hamitic Hypothesis through the issuing of identity cards that permanently grouped individual Rwandans as either Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.<sup>88</sup>

Like secular European thought, the Church embraced the “contemporary conceptions of race and nationality that viewed the world’s population as divided into neatly defined, hierarchically ranked groups with specific innate characteristics.”<sup>89</sup> For example, Tharcisse Gatwa notes that, in 1902, Monsignor Léon-Paul-Classe stated that “the Batutsi are superb men, with straightforward and regular features, with something of the Aryan and Semitic type.”<sup>90</sup> Similarly, in 1948, Gatwa remarks that Father Alexandre Arnoux, in his book, *Les Pères Blancs aux Sources du Nil (The White Father at the Sources of the Nile)* (1953), posited that: “Obviously, the Batutsi who are related to the Abyssinians, arrived a long time ago after the other races. Those among them who descended from the nomadic root are recognizable by their Semitic features, height and other physical details.”<sup>91</sup> Here, “physical anthropology was called on to justify the [colonial] theories of difference” present in Church politics.<sup>92</sup>

Carney, Gatwa, Longman, Katongole, Mamdani, Rutayisire, Safari, and van ‘t Spijker note that Classe’s – and more generally, the colonial Church’s – propagation of the Hamitic Hypothesis was deeply seeded in Cardinal Charles Martial Allemand-Lavigérie’s “top-down” pedagogy of evangelization.<sup>93</sup> Carney writes: “Catholic missionaries helped propagate this Hamitic vision of Rwandan society during the first decades of the twentieth century” so as to “protect and promote the institutional interests of the Catholic Church,” namely “to promote ‘Western civilization founded on Christianity.’”<sup>94</sup> Rutayisire states that “this ‘cultural imperialism’ is the result of ‘Christendom’ [philosophy], a kind of Christianity that comes hand in hand with political power, [and is] imposed as a cultural rather than embraced as a choice and lifestyle.”<sup>95</sup>

According to Classe, the aim of Christendom philosophy was to avoid “‘dark days’” if the Church were to “‘take no interest in the apostolate to the ruling class, [and] if, by our acts, we give ground for the opinion that the Catholic faith is that of the poor.’”<sup>96</sup> That is, the catechetical pedagogy of “top-down” evangelization – the conversion of a perceived Tutsi political elite – was a direct extension of secular colonial “divide-and-rule” policy rooted in the Hamitic Hypothesis and propagated so as to protect the “institutional interests of the Catholic Church” in colonial Rwanda.<sup>97</sup>

Cargas, Carney, Gatwa, Gifford, Longman, Rutayisire, and van ‘t Spijker contend that the Church’s implementation of the Hamitic Hypothesis is best expressed via the interwoven relationship between church and state and the institutionalization of mission schools.<sup>98</sup> Carney writes: “Classe introduced a two-tiered educational system in the 1920’s. Students were segregated by ethnic group, and [the] Tutsi[s] received a far more rigorous course [of study]

than their Hutu colleagues.”<sup>99</sup> At Saint Charles Borromeo Major Seminary in Nyakibanda, “the final training ground for future Rwandan Catholic priests between 1935 and 1962,” this two-tiered education system was apparent.<sup>100</sup> Carney states: “Tutsi students. . . began to dominate seminary admissions” in the 1920s.<sup>101</sup> Quoting a 1927 excerpt by Classe, Carney contends that: “‘The question is whether the ruling elite will be for or against us, whether the important places in native society will be in Catholic or non-Catholic hands; whether the Church will have through education, and its formation of youth, the preponderant influence in Rwanda.’”<sup>102</sup>

Rutayisire, citing Philip Jenkins’ book, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (2011), notes: “‘Most of the first generation of independent Africa’s political leadership was Christian, commonly the product of mission schools, and these pioneers were often active church members in their own right.’”<sup>103</sup> Rutayisire contends that mission schools and seminaries in colonial and post-colonial Rwanda created “self-serving leadership” within the colonial administration and that this resulted in “conversion without real life transformation.”<sup>104</sup> That is, missionary schools focused on shaping “a model of [Rwandan] society based on Hamite supremacy” so as to “preserve their position” of the Church – the influence of a “Roman, not an African agenda” – in the socio-political atmosphere of colonial Rwanda.<sup>105</sup> For Gatwa, “The missionaries had reached an agreement with the colonial administration on political reforms aiming at removing so-called ‘old guides’ [traditional chiefs] from the administration. . . [The] pushing [of] the population to conversion [therefore] became both a duty and a motive for [the] political survival” of the institutional Church, a policy that relied on and resulted in a bifurcated, ethnically racialized, post-colonial nation-state.<sup>106</sup>

### *3.5: The 1959 “Hutu Revolution,” Independence, and Nationalism*

In his book, *The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State* (1992), Basil Davidson argues that the post-independent African nation-state has been institutionally subjected to the European nation-state model and has thus been enveloped in a “period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe.”<sup>107</sup> That is, Davidson contends that the formation of the post-independent African nation-state led to a sustained, though indirect, colonial rule through the imposition of European political entities. Davidson states: “This is a crisis of institutions. . . An analysis of Africa’s troubles also has to be an inquiry into the process – the process, largely of nationalism – that has crystallized the division of Africa’s many hundreds of peoples and cultures into a

few dozen nation-states, each claiming sovereignty against the other, and all of them sorely in trouble.”<sup>108</sup>

Katongole, in his article, “Christianity, Tribalism, and the Rwandan Genocide: A Catholic Reassessment of Christian ‘Social Responsibility’” (2005a), states: “Tribal identity and violence associated with tribalism are wired into the imaginative landscape of modern nation-state politics. . . . The underlying problem behind the Rwanda genocide is one of tribalism.”<sup>109</sup> Here, Katongole defines “tribalism” as constructed “political identities” rooted in distinct, rigidly separated racialized ethnic groups.<sup>110</sup> How did the “agents of Christian civilization” – the Church – influence the post-colonial “social imagination” – the political (tribal) identities constructed by colonial society and “reproduced within the history of the Rwandan state” – prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.<sup>111</sup>

Preceding the 1959 “Hutu Revolution,” Carney notes that Grégoire Kayibanda, the president of Rwanda between 1962 and 1973, “associated the church’s civilizing mission with the Catholic obligation to protect the common good and defend Rwanda’s status as a bulwark of African Christianity. . . . ‘baptizing the structures and institutions’ of Rwanda” so as to provide a “basis for the further evolution of Rwandan society.”<sup>112</sup> In the late 1940’s, “a new post-World War II generation of missionaries mainly from Belgium and France” arrived in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda.<sup>113</sup> Such members of the clergy included: “Gilles, Dejemeppe, Adrianssens, Ernotte, Pien, and Perraudin.”<sup>114</sup> Safari notes that these missionaries were “a ‘different bread from the old royalist White Fathers’. . . . [They] came to Rwanda with a sense of urgency on issues of social justice and liberation. . . . tend[ing] to identify with the Hutu grievances and desire for emancipation.”<sup>115</sup> In practice, Carney states that “this meant replacing Rwanda’s ancestral custom with Western economic, political, and human rights standards, closely associating the building of the Christian kingdom with the furthering of democracy and the resolution of Rwanda’s social problems.”<sup>116</sup>

In 1953, King Mutara III Rudahigwa began the secular movement from pre-colonial and colonial administration to post-colonial nation-statism through the abolition of the “*uburetwa* (forced labor) and *ubuhake* (patron-client relationships)” in pre-colonial Rwandan society.<sup>117</sup> Carney notes that “missionaries and indigenous Catholic journalists exhorted Catholics to join and shape Rwanda’s evolving ‘march for progress.’”<sup>118</sup> Though this was the case, Katongole notes: “The basic story embodied within the nation-state in Africa” was never questioned – the Church “failed to question these so-called natural identities (successively named races, tribes, [and] ethnicities) or to provide an

alternative conception or imagination to the tribalism within [post-colonial] Rwanda.”<sup>119</sup> For example, in 1957, under the guidance of Fathers Dejemeppe and Ernotte, the Hutu elite published *“La Note sur l'Aspect Social du Problème Racial Indigène au Rwanda”* (“Note on the Social Aspect of the Indigenous Racial Problem in Rwanda”, commonly referred to as *“Le Manifeste des Bahutu”* (“The Bahutu Manifesto”), demanding “the retention of ‘ethnic designation in official documents,’” while locating “Rwanda’s tensions in the evils of Belgian Indirect Rule.”<sup>120</sup> Mamdani states that “the Bahutu Manifesto” “called for a double liberation of the Hutu: ‘from both the ‘Hamites’ and ‘Bazungu’ (white) colonization” and established the future tone of Hutu power: Hutu nationalism.<sup>121</sup>

To address “Hutu grievances and [the] desire for emancipation,” in 1959, “with the blessing of Chanoine Ernotte and Father Endriatis,” Kayibanda established *Le Parti du Mouvement de l'Émancipation Hutu* (The Party of Movement of the Hutu Emancipation) or *Le Mouvement Démocratique Republicain – Parmehutu* (The Republican Democratic Movement – Parmehutu), commonly referred to as MDR-PARMEHUTU, with the aim of defending the “‘politics of equilibrium,’ through which jobs and positions were divided according to the percentage of Hutu (85%) and Tutsi (15%).”<sup>122</sup> Later that year, the MDR-PARMEHUTU abolished the Tutsi monarchy with the support of the colonial government and the Church and, by 1962, the MDR-PARMEHUTU were the sole political party of the newly independent nation-state of Rwanda, directly influencing the policy of the First Republic (1962–1973).<sup>123</sup>

### *3.6: Post-Colonialism: The Church and the Nation-State*

At the time of independence in 1962, Mamdani notes that Rwanda was an institutionally and ethnically divided state. He writes: “The political legacy of indirect-rule colonialism in Africa was a bifurcated state: civic[ally] and ethnic[ally]” entrenched in institutional racialized ethnic discrimination.<sup>124</sup> Moreover, this bifurcated state continued under Presidents Grégoire Kayibanda (the First Republic, 1962–1973) and Juvénal Habyarimana (the Second Republic, 1973–1994) and resulted in numerous Hutu–Tutsi conflicts, culminating in the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

R. Scott Appleby, in his book, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (2000) writes: “Secularization shifts the social location of religion, influences the structures it assumes and the way people perform religious functions, or forces religion to redefine the nature, grounds, and scope of its authority. . . . Believers transfer religious loyalties to the nation, ‘the people.’”<sup>125</sup> From 1962–1994, the “social location” of the Church shifted

from a colonial “civilizational mission” to the newly formed “democratic” nation-state.<sup>126</sup> Thus, the Church and her members remained “externally driven,” assuming the nation-state to be “the primary social actor, with power to define, manage, and control the social realm.”<sup>127</sup>

In 1966, the government of Kayibanda and the MDR-PARMEHUTU, nationalized all educational institutions in Rwanda under the condition that the state would be responsible for the “recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of students” and “staff, both lay and religious.”<sup>128</sup> Fearing the seizure of parochial schools, a secularized educational curriculum, and the “recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of students” and “staff, both lay and religious,” the bishops of Rwanda issued an unequivocal condemnation of the government of Kayibanda and the MDR-PARMEHUTU in 1973, stating: “If there are social problems to be resolved, and there is no lack of them, let those who are in charge, and not individuals and anonymous groups, do so by means of dialogue.”<sup>129</sup> In response to this statement, the government of Kayibanda and the MDR-PARMEHUTU “sacked the Tutsi Monsignor Matthieu, from his position as Rector of the seminary of Nyundo and replaced him with a Hutu soldier, Major Alex Kanyarengwe.”<sup>130</sup> Safari states: “The government of Kayibanda had moved from the shadow of the Catholic Church and was taking an anti-clerical position.”<sup>131</sup>

With the “support of the Catholic Church,” Juvénal Habyarimana – “a leader hand-picked by Catholic Church officials” – launched a coup d’état in 1973 and subsequently seized control of the Rwandan nation-state.<sup>132</sup> Gatwa states: “The Church’s legitimization of the 1973–1994 military regime had two axes. First, the hierarchy accepted the invitation to participate individually in the organs of the ruling party. . . . Second, by rule of law, every single Rwandan born or to be born, was forcibly enrolled as a member of the MRND.”<sup>133</sup> Accepting the government of Habyarimana and *Le Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (The National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development), commonly referred to as the MRND, the Church downplayed the continued racialization and systematic discrimination of Tutsis in favor of “institutional [political] privilege.”<sup>134</sup>

In his article, “A Roundabout Revolution: Rethinking Decolonization of Rwanda by the Practices of the Catholic Scouting Movement, 1954–1964” (2015), Thomas Riot recounts the educational practices propagated by the Church in its switch from Tutsi to Hutu political support. Riot states: “At the beginning of the 1950s, bishops in Rwanda made the decision to strengthen the structures of the Catholic movement,” opting for the *xaveri* formula.<sup>135</sup> Riot suggests that this movement “played a key role in the social and cultural transformation of the



educated [Hutu] youth,” for it was “based on a culturalist and racial fantasy, essentializing socio-economic, cultural, and political structures which existed just before colonization.”<sup>136</sup> In commenting on the rise of the MDR-PERMEHUTU and MRND, Riot writes: “The leaders [of the MDR-PARMEHUTU and MRND]. . . were recruited from the ranks of educated Christian Hutu youth.”<sup>137</sup>

In 1990, the *Armée Patriotique Rwandais/Front Patriotique Rwandais* (Rwandan Patriotic Army/Rwandan Patriotic Front), commonly referred to as the APR/FPR (RPA/RPF), invaded the nation-state of Rwanda in response to the violence propagated against Tutsis by the government of Habyarimana and *Le Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement*.<sup>138</sup> Longman contends: “Because they [the Church] did not speak out against the anti-Tutsi violence [between 1962 and 1993] and the growing propaganda being broadcast throughout the country, but on the contrary displayed their own anti-Tutsi prejudices, the Church leaders’ continued call for support of the regime in a time of war was interpreted by the public as an endorsement of the anti-Tutsi message. . . . Rwandan Christians came to believe that organizing to defend against potential Tutsi treachery was consistent with well established Church practice.”<sup>139</sup>

### *3.7: The Church Accused: Silence and Complicity*

In his dissertation, *Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda* (2015), Antoine Rutayisire states that the Christianity that was brought to the present-day nation-state of Rwanda did not prove in “its capacity to influence and change the social landscape of the continent,” but “became a ‘prisoner to [colonial and post-colonial] culture’ rather than being a ‘liberator.’”<sup>140</sup> Similarly, Basil Davidson remarks: “They [the Church] saw themselves in any case as the agents of Christian civilization in an Africa sorely in need. . . . of every form of salvation.”<sup>141</sup> During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, did the Church have “any power to save them [the Tutsis] from this nightmare?”<sup>142</sup>

Assessing the Church’s role in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, Longman contends, “If churches became implicated in Rwanda’s genocide, it was not simply because church leaders hoped to avoid opposing their governmental allies but because ethnic conflict was an integral part of Christianity in Rwanda. Christians could kill without obvious qualms of conscience. . . . because Christianity as they had always known it had been a religion defined by struggles for power.”<sup>143</sup> Furthermore, Longman states: “Because they [the

clergy] owed their power at least in part to ethnic politics within the churches, church leaders perceived threats to their power partially in ethnic terms,” for during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the Church operated “explicitly [within a] political paradigm.”<sup>144</sup>

Katongole notes: “The victims[of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda] and their killers were quite familiar with each other and had even participated regularly in the same Eucharist[ic] celebrations, within the same church.”<sup>145</sup> Similarly, Cargas writes: “*Génocidaires* were going to church services on the same day they were committing their crimes.”<sup>146</sup> Speaking to this crisis of identity, Katongole states that Gary Scheer, in his article, “Rwanda: Where was the Church?” (1995), posits that Christianity in Rwanda took on a “superficial nature” by “self-confessed Christians,” both the laity and the clergy.<sup>147</sup>

Among the clergy, Peterson Tumwebaze, in his article, “Inside Nyakibanda Seminary: How the Church is Moving on” (2016), states that Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka was notoriously known for “carrying a gun on his hip and colluding with the Hutu militia” during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.<sup>148</sup> Chris McGreal writes, “[For Munyeshyaka], “There was no cross. It was just the gun.”<sup>149</sup> Furthermore, Tumwebaze notes that “like Munyeshyaka, Father Athanase Seromba ordered the bulldozing of his church with 2,000 Tutsi inside and had the [remaining] survivors shot.”<sup>150</sup>

Although this was the case, Munyeshyaka and Tumwebaze were not the majority of clergy, but rather the minority: most failed to “speak out” and instead remained silent, committing “sins of omission” against their people.<sup>151</sup> Van ‘t Spijker states: “The leaders of the Church as a whole. . . saw themselves mainly as mediators between the different politicians, rather than seeing critically to the churches itself, and taking their own position independent of the state. . . Mediators easily become facilitators, and the church leaders who become facilitators of politicians easily forget to speak a *prophetic message*” (my emphasis).<sup>152</sup> As Jean Ndorimana, in his book, *Rwanda: L’Eglise Catholique dans le Malaise: Symptomes et Temoignages (Rwanda: The Catholic Church in the Malaise: Symptoms and Testimonies)* (2001), states: “l’Église doit encourager les silencieux. . . On se demandera jusqu’à quand l’Église du Rwanda sera complaisant vis-à-vis bienfaiteurs et continuera à sacrifier sa dignité et sa liberté” (“The Church must [have] encourage[d] the silence. . . We will wonder just how long the Church of Rwanda will be complacent towards benefactors and will continue to sacrifice its dignity and freedom,” my translation), acting as

“‘prisoner[s] to [colonial and post-colonial] culture’ rather than being  
‘liberator[s].’”<sup>153</sup>

## Presentation and Analysis of Data

### *4.1: Demographic Overview*

This study consisted of six participants between the ages of forty and sixty, four male, and two female. All participants self-identified as Catholic prior to, during, or in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Not all participants were born in Rwanda nor presently self-identify as Catholic. Two participants were born in Uganda, two presently self-identify as Anglican, and one participant self-identified as a non-institutional, or cultural, Catholic.

Participants' vocational status in the Church (i.e., marriage, priesthood, religious life, or single life) varied. Four out of six participants were married. One participant stated that she was single, and the last participant reported that he was a Catholic priest, ordained after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Of the married participants, one remarked that he was a former Catholic priest, ordained after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, one participant said he had gone through seminary education, but abstained from ordination, and two participants reported that they were married outside of the Church.

Of the five participants that identified as married or single, all disclosed that they had at least two biological children, with the minimum number of biological children being two and the maximum number of biological children being four.

"Appendix A" questions one to six (hereafter referred to as: A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, and A6), lists the interview questions relevant for the attainment of demographic information and "Appendix B" lists other demographic and interview information collected for each participant.

### *4.2: Participant Introduction to, Education in, and Description of the Catholic Faith prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi*

In conducting this study participants were asked the following three questions:

[A8] How were you introduced to the Catholic faith? By whom?

[A9] How were you educated in the Catholic faith? By whom?

[A10] Could you describe how the Catholic faith was taught to you?

Six participants stated that they were born into the Catholic faith and educated in Catholic primary and secondary schools, or minor and major seminary. Five of six participants noted that they were introduced to the Church and influenced by either their parents, parish priest(s), parish catechist(s), or primary and secondary, or minor and major seminary, teachers, if applicable. And, one participant (ID 002) stated: “I don’t think anyone was influential. I was just born into the Catholic faith. . . I don’t think these people [his parents, parish priest(s), parish catechist(s), and primary and minor seminary teachers] had the intentionality to influence my faith.”<sup>154</sup> (This information is displayed in “Appendix C”).

Of the six participants in this study, three revealed that prayer was an integral part of their catechesis (either via communal prayer or learning how to pray). One participant noted that attendance at Sunday mass prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi was stressed by his parents. Four participants reported that they attended sacramental preparation classes taught by their parish catechist(s) prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. And three participants stated that behavioral morals such as “do not commit violence,” “do not steal,” and “do not disrespect authoritative figures” were stressed by their parents, parish priest(s), parish catechist(s), or primary and secondary, or minor and major seminary, teachers. Two participants noted that these behavioral morals were rooted in the moral code of the Ten Commandments, and one suggested that the assimilation to a life like Christ was the key tenet of his catechetical education.

Additionally, three participants expressed that catechesis, both by parish catechist(s) and primary and secondary, or minor and major seminary, teachers focused heavily on the memorization of prayers, Church history, or dogmatic practices. Of the six participants, two conveyed that catechesis, both by parish catechist(s) and primary and secondary, or minor and major seminary, teachers was routine – not critical engagement – based. ID 002 remarked: “You took classes on religion, but they didn’t have any such thing as intentionality. You just had to pass the exam.”<sup>155</sup> Last, one participant (ID 004) reported that: “The Church did not directly teach its members to read the Bible” and that this was “the weakness of the Catholic teaching in Rwanda.”<sup>156</sup>

### *4.3: The Church and Missiology*

In order to assess the role of the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, participants were asked a series of five questions in order to identify the defining elements of the Church's missiological teaching prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. These questions focused on the universal messages that the Church idealized prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, not their implementation by members of the clergy, the laity, or the institutional Church. For example, "What key messages were repeatedly emphasized?" and "What did these messages – and the way they were taught – teach you about what it meant to be a 'good' Catholic?" (Refer to "Appendix A," questions A11, A12, A13, A14, and A15).

All participants stated that the Church taught that the Catholic faith was not just an ideology, but a lifestyle meant to be lived. Additionally, each participant noted that the Church taught that this lifestyle was grounded in Biblical values. Three of six participants stated that the Church taught that the Catholic lifestyle stressed prayer on behalf of the society at large, and two noted that the Church taught to love without ceasing. One participant (ID 005) commented: "Jesus loved His neighbors, [the Church taught that] you should love your neighbors" and "Jesus forgave His neighbors, [the Church taught that] you should forgive your neighbors."<sup>157</sup> Three participants mentioned that the Church taught that the segregation and division of peoples ought to be avoided. ID 001 stated: "When you're [in] a movement, you don't segregate. . . You're a member of the human race."<sup>158</sup>

Furthermore, ID 001 posited that the faith taught to him by the Church had put him "in the position to be different from someone who does not fear God. . . [but] to ask how [his] action[s] were going to be judged by God?"<sup>159</sup>

### *4.4: Clergy and the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi*

In order to assess the role of priests and seminary educators prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, participants that identified as members of the clergy, former members of the clergy, or former seminarians were asked the following series of questions:

[A16] Could you describe seminary education? What messages did the seminary promote prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda?

What attitudes were present at the seminary prior to or during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi?

[A17]What actions did priests or seminary educators take prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi?

Through an assessment of the role of priests and seminary educators prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, these questions were designed to address the universal missiological teaching of the Church, focusing on the Church's implementation of these teachings (i.e., messages, attitudes, and actions taken by members of the clergy and seminary educators) prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

Two participants noted that seminary education was knowledge-based with little, if any, focus on vocational discernment (i.e., engaging seminarians through an assessment of their vocational 'calling'). One participant acknowledged that there was no education outside of analytic philosophy and theology. ID 002 stated: "You accumulated lots of knowledge about this and that. . . Lots of information. . . But really taking you through this [vocational] 'calling' to an active faith [life] was an area of weakness [in the Church in Rwanda]." <sup>160</sup> Furthermore, ID 002 stated: "[There was] an intentionality to commit to the Church, not to a lifestyle. . . It was more a commitment to the Church than to Jesus, to God." <sup>161</sup>

All three participants revealed that the identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were not regularly discussed and, if they were, the subject was taboo. One participant posited that "apparently we [seminarians] lived in harmony." <sup>162</sup> Another participant noted that the Church reinforced the Migration Hypothesis, the notion that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa came to the present-day nation-state of Rwanda from different geographical regions at different times in history, and a Politics of Equilibrium, through which jobs and positions were divided according to the percentage of Hutu (85%) and Tutsi (15%) in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda, prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Additionally, one participant (ID 006) stated these conversations "were not so much in the public, but in the corridors. . . It was a reality, but people never used to talk about it [the identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa] openly." <sup>163</sup> For another participant (ID 002), this displayed an "extreme synchronization of religion to politics." <sup>164</sup>

*4.5: Participant Interpretations of the Church's Missiological Practices Prior to and During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi*

Regarding participant's interpretations of the missiological practices of the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, four questions were asked:

[A18]Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, what do you remember as key ideas or themes that priests preached about at mass?

[A19]Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, how would you describe the attitudes and actions priests promoted from the pulpit? Could you offer an example?

[A21]Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, what do you remember about the role and influence of the Church?

[A22]During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, do you recall priests speaking out against genocide ideology in Rwanda? If so, what did they say?

Through an assessment of the missiological practices of the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, these questions were designed to address perceptions and experiences of the messages, attitudes, and actions taken by the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

Four of six participants stated that the messages propagated by the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi were not applicable to day-to-day life. Four of six also noted that these messages followed a rigid, unchanging paradigm intentioned on allegiance to the Church as an institution rather than personal transformation. Likewise, four participants illustrated this via perceptions of pre-genocide and genocide homiletics, stating that many churchgoers didn't comprehend the messages they were receiving. Two participants posited that this was because homiletics was largely text-oriented, failing to offer an explanation of the Biblical narrative. One participant noted that Latin was the predominant language of homiletic teaching, and another participant (ID 002) stated: "People [The clergy] fell into the trap of text engagement, ignoring the question: 'What does it mean for me?'"<sup>165</sup>

Two participants noted that clergy members often did not speak out on social issues prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi; they stated that this largely reflected the attitudes held by the Church, especially its leaders. Three participants remarked that faith served politics prior to and during the



1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. One participant (006) stated that the Church was “part and parcel with the state. . . fighting for the good of the state [instead of]. . . talking on behalf of God.”<sup>166</sup>

One participant (ID 003) remarked that an “enemy” definition was propagated by the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, stating that this definition arose during the 1992 APR/FPR (RPA/RPF) invasion of the present-day nation-state of Rwanda and that this definition “matched the news about the RPF and. . . identified the enemy as [Tutsis] hiding within the country.”<sup>167</sup> This participant also noted that the Church sought self-preservation prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, stating that priests “played between two ideologies,” embracing both Hutu extremism and Tutsi persecutionism. Lastly, one participant (ID 004) stated that the Church was “weak in testifying for Jesus. . . [in] giving a testimony to Rwandan society.”<sup>168</sup>

#### *4.6: Participant Identity: The Church and the Nation-State*

In order to assess Catholic identity prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, participants were asked to describe the relationship between the Church and the pre-genocide government of Rwanda, noting the balance between religious and political identity. (Refer to “Appendix A,” question A25).

Three of six participants stated that the ideal relationship between the Church and the state should be complementarity. However, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, these participants noted that Church-state relations were dichotomous contradictions of one another with the Church failing to live up to its mission and the state wrongfully exercising its power. Four participants stated that the Church was either too close to the state or directly involved in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. One participant said the Church was politically closed off, failing to challenge the state paradigm. Likewise, two participants conveyed that the Church reinforced the state paradigm through educational practices and its homiletic attitudes. One participant (ID 004) remarked: “[It was] a crisis of identity,” while another (ID 006) stated that the Church should have acted as the “moral conscience of the state,” forming the “moral conscience of the people.”<sup>169</sup>

One participant (ID 001) commented: “I have never thought about this [the balance between religious and political identity] until now.”<sup>170</sup>

#### *4.7: The Impact of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi on Participants’ Faith*

Lastly, participants were asked to describe how the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi impacted their personal faith life. (Refer to “Appendix A,” questions A20, A23, A24, A26, and A27).

Two participants stated that the Church’s role in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi was an element present in their conversion from Catholicism to Anglicanism, though they noted that this was not the only motive. One participant stated that she was more critical of her trust in the institutional Church following the Church’s role in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, while another participant conferred that the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi had made her faith more fervent. Last, one participant expressed that the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda did not affect his faith, for “faith is not between me and the people who are the authorities in the Church, but between me and God.”<sup>171</sup>

## Interpretation of Data

*Conrad said it best: “All [of] Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz.”*<sup>172</sup>

### 5.1: Introduction

In his book, *Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda* (2009), Emmanuel Katongole states that “our identities are never simple reflections,” for “all identities are formed over time and shaped by the stories we live into.”<sup>173</sup> The Church, for Katongole, should be driven by its mission “to be a new community that bears witness to the fact that in Christ there is a new identity. . . to embody the hope of a new Creation,” recognizing that “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free person, there is not male and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”<sup>174</sup> The Acts of the Apostles states that the Church should devote itself “to the communal life, to the breaking of the bread, and to the prayers. . . [to] ha[ving] all things in common. . . sell[ing] [its] property and possessions and divid[ing] them among all according to each one’s need. . . [to devoting itself] to meeting together in the temple area and to breaking bread in their homes. . . with exultation and sincerity of heart, praising God and *enjoying favor with all the people*” (my emphasis).<sup>175</sup>

Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, Katongole notes that the Church was deeply influenced by the “social memory and [the] political formation” of colonial rule, and the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, especially “the stories embedded in [the] social and political institutions” of colonial rule.<sup>176</sup> For Timothy Longman, in his article, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda (2001), the Church “became implicated in Rwanda’s genocide” because it was “not simply [an] all[y] of the government but [an] important player in [the] contestation for state power” and was integrally tied to colonial “identity politics” (i.e., the Hamitic Hypothesis, a two-tiered education system, etc.).<sup>177</sup>

In order to construct a general account of the pre-genocidal identity narrative present in the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, this study was framed by two questions: (1) did the Church, as an institution, offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of

racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda? If it did not, why not? And, (2) what role, if any, did the Church, as an institution, play, in promoting a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda, that fostered genocide ideology?

Research on the role of the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, concentrated on Church missiology, with a focus on the messages promulgated, the attitudes held, and the actions taken by the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

### *5.2: The Messages Promulgated by the Church Prior to and During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi*

R. Scott Appleby, in his book, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred* (2000), states: “[In] the modern West. . . the development and institutionalization of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ realms of life as separate cultural and social spaces” has occurred through the adoption of “a minimalist attitude toward religion’s possible role vis-à-vis the state.”<sup>178</sup> For Appleby, the “social location” of religion was shifted via the secularization of the nation-state during the Enlightenment period. Appleby posits that secularization “force[d] religion to redefine the nature, grounds, and scope of its authority. . . transfer[ing] religious loyalties to the nation, ‘the people.’”<sup>179</sup> Katongole notes that the Church assumed colonial rule and the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda to be “the primary social actor[s], with power to define, manage, and control the social realm.”<sup>180</sup> Thus, the Church and its members were “externally driven” and detached from the “unique social location, institutional configuration, [and] cultural, power” that the Church should have had prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.<sup>181</sup>

The question of the identity of the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, must begin with an analysis of the pre-genocidal identity *narrative* promulgated by and present in the Church. In his book, *Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda* (2009), Emmanuel Katongole states that “identities get shaped by stories that so often remain hidden.”<sup>182</sup> Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, Katongole states that the Church assumed that the racialized ethnic identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were natural, not “*formed* identities” (authors emphasis).<sup>183</sup> Antoine Rutayisire, in his dissertation, *Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda*

(2015), suggests that the Church “became a victim of self-serving leadership,” attaching itself to these formed identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, and thus engaging in colonial identity politics as a means of self-preservation.<sup>184</sup> J.J. Carney, in his article, “Beyond Tribalism: The Hutu-Tutsi Question and Catholic Rhetoric in Colonial Rwanda” (2012a), writes: “Catholic missionaries helped propagate this Hamitic vision of Rwandan society during the first decades of the twentieth century” and that Léon-Paul Classe’s “patronage of young Tutsi elites in the late 1920s and 1930s reflected first and foremost his desire to protect and promote the institutional interests of the Catholic Church.”<sup>185</sup>

Participants in this study offered evidence that Church-state relations were dichotomous contradictions of one another with the Church failing to live up to its prophetic mission and the state wrongfully exercising its power. To a person, ID 004, 006, and 002 described the “crisis of identity” in the Church, and argued that it should have acted as the “moral conscience of the state,” forming the “moral conscience of the people.” Instead they saw an “extreme synchronization of religion to politics.”<sup>186</sup> Moreover, ID 006 noted: “The people in [the Church’s] authority should have condemned what was happening [prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi].”<sup>187</sup> Instead, as Longman and Ndorimana have argued that the Church committed “sins of omission” because it failed to act as the conscience of the state being “malheureux les silencieux” (“unfortunately the silent ones,” my translation).<sup>188</sup>

Furthermore, narratives offered by participants in this study suggest that the messages promulgated by the Church seldom lived up to the universal messages that the Church idealized prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. For example, all participants noted that the Church taught that the Christian life should be informed by Biblical values, but the reality, as ID 002 put it, was that the expectation was “to commit to the Church, not to a lifestyle. . . It was more a commitment to the Church than to Jesus, to God.”<sup>189</sup> Similarly, all participants revealed that the identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were not regularly discussed and, if they were, the subject was taboo, despite three participants mentioning that the Church taught that the segregation and division of peoples ought to be avoided and that societal injustices ought to be addressed. These interviewee accounts support what, W Carney, Gatwa, Longman, Katongole, Mamdani, Rutayisire, Safari, and van ‘t Spijker have previously argued: that Classe’s – and more generally, the colonial Church’s – propagation of the Hamitic Hypothesis was deeply seeded in Cardinal Charles Martial Allemand-Lavigérie’s “top-down” pedagogy of evangelization” and that this was missiologically present in European colonial rule and the post-

independent nation-state of Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.<sup>190</sup>

Did the Church's messages in Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi recognize that there was neither the Civilized nor the Dark Continent, neither Bantu nor Hamite, neither Hutu nor Tutsi, but that the Church should recognize and enjoy favor with all people, for all are one in Christ Jesus?<sup>191</sup>

The participants interviewed for this study certainly did not tell that story. Indeed, all offered perspectives that affirmed that the “meta-narrative” of the Church prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi was dominated by a “poverty of [the social] imagination.” The narrative did little to transform the colonial and post-independent nation-state message, nor did it offer “a fresh lens through which to see ourselves, others, and the world. . . to shape a new identity within us by creating a new sense of *we* – a new community that defies our usual categories of anthropology” (authors emphasis).<sup>192</sup>

Further, interviewees provided evidence that the messages of the Church, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, recognized, promulgated, and lived within the constructed political identities of the Civilized versus the Dark Continent, the Bantus versus Hamites, and the Hutus versus the Tutsis, doing little to offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of the racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Interviewee accounts also leant credibility to the view that the Church, as an institution, was not active in promoting a “social imagination,” but rather reinforced a political narrative dominated by secular European colonial ideology and the nationalistic fervor of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda.

### *5.3: The Attitudes Held by the Church Prior to and During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi*

In his apostolic exhortation, *Gaudete et Exsultate* (2018), Pope Francis states: “How can we fail to realize the need to stop this rat race and to recover the personal space needed to carry on a heartfelt dialogue with God?”<sup>193</sup> In his 2015 Lenten address, “‘Make Your Hearts Firm’ (James 5:8),” Pope Francis warns against a “globalization of indifference” in which a “selfish *attitude* of indifference has taken on global proportions” (my emphasis), stating: “In this body [the Church] there is no room for the indifference which so often seems to possess our hearts. For whoever is of Christ, belongs to one body, and in Him

we cannot be indifferent to one another. ‘If one part suffers, all the parts suffer with it; if one part is honored, all the parts share its joy’ (1 Corinthians 12:26).”<sup>194</sup> Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the attitude of the Church, as an institution, widely reflected an “*attitude* of indifference” (my emphasis).<sup>195</sup>

When asked about who was influential in the early development of his faith life, ID 002 stated: “I don’t think anyone was influential. I was just born into the Catholic faith.”<sup>196</sup> Later, ID 002 expanded on this thought stating: “I don’t think these people [the Church, as an institution] had the intentionality to influence one’s faith. They just go through the routines, so their students become this and that.”<sup>197</sup> ID 002 also felt that his experience at Catholic primary school was comparable: “You took classes on religion, but they didn’t have any such thing as intentionality. You just had to pass the exam. There wasn’t such a thing as calling someone to a commitment. . . People just passed [on] information, there was no such thing as an intentional call to commitment.”<sup>198</sup> ID 002 went on to note that: “Minor seminary was worse. You accumulated lots of knowledge about this and that. . . Lots of information. . . But really taking you through this calling to active faith was an area of weakness. It was [an] intentionality to commit to the Church, not to a lifestyle. And when it was a call to a lifestyle, it was a routine, saying prayers before bed, before meals. . . It was more a commitment to the Church than to Jesus, to God.”<sup>199</sup>

ID 002’s sentiments largely reflect the view of participants, who were living in Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi (see “Appendix A,” questions A8–A17). Specifically, ID 002’s comments shed light on the attitude of the Church, as an institution, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. For many that I interviewed, the Church, as an institution, was characterized by a catechetical paradigm of routine and the accumulation of knowledge without reference to practical, lived application. This finding is consistent with what Antoine Rutayisire wrote in his dissertation, *Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda* (2015): “Those [scholars] who write from a spiritual, theological perspective point out the problems of churches that were planted on flawed missiological practices that led to conversions without real life transformation.”<sup>200</sup> Rutayisire argues that “the kind of Christianity that was brought to the [African] continent. . . [did not] influence and change the social landscape of the continent,” but rather preached heaven “without transforming earth.”<sup>201</sup>

Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the participants I spoke with for this study told stories that suggested that Catholic missionaries failed to think outside of what Paul Gifford, in his article, “Recent Developments in African Christianity” (1995), calls, the “‘church growth’ school of California.”<sup>202</sup> Gifford states: “The new missionaries to Africa are normally not working in development or schools or clinics; the vast majority are concerned with evangelization pure and simple.”<sup>203</sup> Although colonial missionaries were often interwoven with development, Gifford’s statement reflects the focus that colonial missionaries had on the number of baptisms performed at the expense of Christianity’s influence on social ethics in society. Furthermore, this “*attitude of indifference*” (my emphasis), coupled with the ideology of the “‘church growth’ school of California,” detached Eucharistic celebrations from the Great Commission to “go, therefore, and make *disciples* of all nations. . . teaching them to observe all that I [Jesus] have commanded you [the Church]” (my emphasis), not just to not just to baptize “them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the holy Spirit.”<sup>204</sup>

During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, this “*attitude of indifference*” (my emphasis), elicited itself in the non-action of members of the clergy and the Church to openly speak out against the atrocities.<sup>205</sup> Interviewees emphasized this point, especially when they criticized the Church for what it did not say or do. Congruent with what Van ‘t Spijker writes, this attitude occurred because “the Roman Catholic Church. . . had before 1994 almost taken the position [as] the State Church. . . the official Church hierarchy tended to keep close to the political leaders in power, and restricted themselves. . . compromise[ing] the Church by relating itself too closely to the government.”<sup>206</sup>

The attitude of the Church, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, was thus confined to colonial rule and the pre-genocide nation-state state, positing itself within the “political ideology at any cost.”<sup>207</sup> As Katongole notes: “Those who accept Rome’s money, usually end up playing by Rome’s rules.”<sup>208</sup> Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the Church was indifferent to the missiology of the state. As ID 002 and 004 respectively stated: “[There was no search for heart,” no one attitude to ask, “Who am I?”<sup>209</sup> As ID 004 put it bluntly, the Church “didn’t have courage” to “testify to the Christian life.”<sup>210</sup>

#### *5.4: The Actions Taken by the Church Prior to and During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi*



Quoting Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, Emmanuel Katongole, in his book, *Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda* (2009), states: “Everything has its time. This is the time for a pistol, not a Bible.”<sup>211</sup> During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, many members of the clergy remained silent; however, some actively participated or were complicit with genocide ideology, and very few fought against it.

When asked about how Catholic education taught him to view other who were politically “different” from him – the categorization of society into Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas – ID 002 stated: “I don’t even remember a time when someone made a sermon about that. It was never mentioned. Honestly, I don’t remember a time during my seminary years, during any of my schooling.”<sup>212</sup> Similarly, ID 003 said that the constructed concepts such as Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were “never brought up. . . Conflict between Hutus and Tutsis was never discussed.”<sup>213</sup> This finding is consistent with what Timothy Longman, in his article, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda” (2001), discovered: “While some local level Church officials were directly involved in preparing and carrying out the genocide in their communities, most critics have condemned the [Church] not for [its] actions but rather for [its] *inaction*” (author’s emphasis).<sup>214</sup>

ID 003 recalled three instances in which political and religious identities became contradictory and manifested in actions. First, she stated that the chairman of *La Coalition pour la Défense de la République*, “was her neighbor” and that during the sign of peace at Sunday mass, “he wouldn’t speak to anyone,” nor would the two share the sign of peace, something uncommon within the Church.<sup>215</sup> Second, ID 003 recollected that “a kind of a relativism in the Legion of Mary movement” had arisen in which administrative leaders “began to lead the movement towards internal conflict, where, for example. . . a woman. . . would organize a meeting and then another one afterwards in which the first offered vague and general messages and the second, in which only Hutus would meet” and discuss, in hatred, Tutsis.<sup>216</sup> ID 003 described the situation in this way: “They [the Church] were directly involved in the political ideology” of the government of Rwanda.<sup>217</sup> Third, ID 003 spoke of a European priest whose parish was in the 1992 *Zone Tamponne*. She stated that he “played between the two” ideologies (that of the RPA and that of the government of Rwanda), “embracing the dynamics and playing in a way in which he was accepted anywhere, but he didn’t help to address the [underlying] issues” of Hutu and Tutsi.<sup>218</sup>

ID 003’s remarks offer insight into the compartmentalization that, Peterson Tumwebaze described among clergy, in his article, “Inside Nyakibanda Seminary: How the Church is Moving on” (2016). According to Tumwebaze,

Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka was notorious for “carrying a gun on his hip and colluding with the Hutu militia” during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.<sup>148</sup> Chris McGreal writes, “[For Munyeshyaka], “‘There was no cross. It was just the gun.’”<sup>219</sup> Furthermore, Tumwebaze notes that “like Munyeshyaka, Father Athanase Seromba ordered the bulldozing of his church with 2,000 Tutsi inside and had the [remaining] survivors shot.”<sup>220</sup> Longman contends: “Because they [the Church] did not speak out against the anti-Tutsi violence [between 1962 and 1993] and the growing propaganda being broadcast throughout the country, but on the contrary displayed their own anti-Tutsi prejudices, the Church leaders’ continued [to] call for support of the regime.”<sup>221</sup>

The narratives offered by the participants in this support what has been previously discussed by scholars: the majority action taken by Church, prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, was often “interpreted by the public as an endorsement of the anti-Tutsi message. . . [And] Rwandan Christians came to believe that organizing to defend against potential Tutsi treachery was consistent with well established Church practice.”<sup>222</sup> Interview data from this study suggests strongly that the Church, as an institution, did little to promote a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology and the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda. Inaction was the norm and a large minority also engaged in negative action(s). “Conrad said it best: ‘All [of] Europe [including the clergy] contributed to the making of Kurtz.’”<sup>223</sup>

## Conclusion

### 6.1: Conclusion

Sarita Cargas, in her review of Timothy Longman's book, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, states: "One cannot paint all Christian behavior with a single brush. . . [It is] a complex reality."<sup>224</sup> Prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, some members of the Church's clergy *did* speak out against the dominant colonial and pre-genocide nation-state ideology, but few, if any, questioned the underlying narrative that propagated these systems. Few, if any, asked: is the Church, as an institution, offering a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda? And, is the Church promoting a "social imagination" that values religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda?

Pope Francis, in his apostolic exhortation, *Gaudete et Exsultate* (2018), writes: "They may well [have] be[en] *false prophets*, who use[d] religion for their own purposes, to promote their own psychological or intellectual theories" (my emphasis).<sup>225</sup> Here, Francis retorts "*a doctrine without mystery*" (author's emphasis) stating: "Gnosticism gave way to another heresy, likewise present in our day. As time passed, many came to realize that *it is not knowledge that betters us or makes us saints, but the kind of life we lead*" (my emphasis), namely the reduction and constriction of the Gospel message to "certain rules, customs, or ways of acting."<sup>226</sup> Under European colonial rule and in the pre-genocide nation-state of Rwanda this form of Gnosticism was acutely manifested in the missiological teaching of the Church – the messages promulgated, the attitudes held, and the actions taken by the Church, as an institution – as an educational philosophy rooted in spiritual knowledge, failing to teach the practical applications of a life of faith. Francis states: "The result [wa]s a self-centered and elitist complacency, bereft of love."<sup>227</sup>

Based on what I learned from interviewees in this study, the Church, as an institution, did little to offer a convincing counter-narrative to the dominant ideology of racialized ethnic identities of twentieth century European colonialism in the present-day nation-state of Rwanda. Moreover, their accounts suggest

the Church, as an institution, was not an active player in promoting a “social imagination” that valued religious identity, or truths, over the dominant European colonial ideology, and later the nationalistic narrative of the post-independent nation-state of Rwanda. For those I interviewed, the Church, as an institution, was complicit in fostering genocide ideology insofar as it promoted and failed to counter the situational narrative of colonial and post-independent Rwandan Christian identity.

Unlike ID 001, a Catholic raised in the present-day nation-state of Uganda, the Church in Rwanda did not “put [people] in the position to be different from [those] who [do] not fear God. . . To ask how [their] action[s] [are] going to be judged by God?”<sup>228</sup> Rather, the Church failed to ask, “Who am I?” and this lay at the root of becoming “weak in testifying for Jesus” in “giving a testimony to Rwandan society.”<sup>229</sup> For those I interviewed for this study, the Church did not live in its prophetic mission to recognize that “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free person, there is not male and female,” for all are one in Christ Jesus.<sup>230</sup>

## *6.2: Recommendations for Further Research*

In his post-synodal apostolic exhortation, *Ecclesia in Africa* (1995), Pope John Paul II observed that “so much fratricidal hate inspired by political interests is tearing our peoples [the Church] apart,” but “the Church has the duty to affirm vigorously that these difficulties can be overcome.”<sup>228</sup> In much the same spirit, Emmanuel Katongole, in his article, “Christianity, Tribalism, and the Rwandan Genocide: A Catholic Reassessment of Christian ‘Social Responsibility’” (2005a), has observed: “Tribalism is connected with the issue of political imagination, the urgent Christian challenge in response to tribalism is one of political reimagination. . . to conceive itself as a ‘wild space’ within which alternative forms of social existence can be engendered.”

As an exploratory study, this research raised important directions for future research. A first is scholars must take seriously the ways in which the Church is called to nurture the “social imagination” of those it serves. Victor Thasiah’s article, “Prophetic Pedagogy: Critically Engaging Public Officials in Rwanda” (2017), begins to formulate a practical means by which the Church can begin to cultivate the “‘wild space’” of “social imagination.” Among others, some of these practical means include further research on the “unique social location, institutional configuration, [and] cultural, power” of the Church, as an institution, in the twenty-first century needs to be undertaken and, I would argue, this is especially true in nation-states that have experienced conflict, such as Rwanda,

Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).<sup>232</sup> Moreover, another promising area for future research involves how the Church, as an institution, can redefine its pedagogical paradigm for seminary education. Unfortunately, because of the limited nature of this study, I was unable to probe in any depth the pedagogical paradigm and content that informed Rwandan seminaries prior to and after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Moving forward, more research is needed in this area – and not only in seminaries in Rwanda. One particularly rich area for future inquiry may be to learn more about seminaries that are experimenting with new pedagogical paradigms, such as those that are integrating the “classical disciplines” of philosophy and theology with the modern disciplines of “anthropology, ethnology, history, and linguistics” to address more meaningfully “new issues [such as] AIDS, ecology, gender, etc.” If the Church is to combat the “complexity of problems” in the modern world, identifying and learning more about new pedagogical models and practices in seminaries – and exploring the impact they may be having on the “social imagination” of lay and ordained leaders and those they serve – this topic is worthy of additional sustained study.<sup>233</sup> Last, further research on church-state interactions needs to be undertaken if the Church is to conceive an alternative to its contemporary relationship with the state. The Church especially needs to ask itself: who are we as an institution that claims an identity as the people of God? What is our role in promoting a “social imagination” that values religious identity, or truths over the dominant socio-political climate of post-modernity? And, how can we live in the post-modern world without compromising the underlying Biblical narrative in which our mission is rooted? All of these questions demand thoughtful reflection, and hold rich potential to inspire the expansion of the Church’s social imagination into the very real and “wild spaces” of a world that desperately needs Christ’s prophetic vision and unconditional love.





## NOTES

- [1] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 25.
- [2] Mamdani, 2001, p. 24
- [3] “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, A/RES/260 (9 December 1948),” 1948.
- [4] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, A/RES/260 (9 December 1948),” 1948.
- [5] Cf. Safari, 2010, p. 876.
- [6] Mamdani, 2001, p. 79.
- [7] Cf. Gatwa, 2000, p. 10.
- [8] Mukamurenzi, C. (2018). *ANTH 3500: Research Methods and Ethics, RME: Literature Review* [PowerPoint slides].
- [9] Mukamurenzi, C. (2018). *ANTH 3500: Research Methods and Ethics, RME: Literature Review* [PowerPoint slides].
- [10] Safari, 2010, p. 877; van ‘t Spijker, 1997, p. 242.
- [11] Zimbardo, 2004, p. 21.
- [12] Mukamurenzi, C. (2018). *ANTH 3500: Research Methods and Ethics, RME: Literature Review* [PowerPoint slides].
- [13] Mukamurenzi, C. (2018). *ANTH 3500: Research Methods and Ethics, RME: Literature Review* [PowerPoint slides].
- [14] Wright Mills, 1959, pp. 5, 7.
- [15] “International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, A/RES/58/234 (23 February 2004),” 2004.
- [16] Katongole, 2005a, p. 71.



[17] Davidson, 1992, p. 98.

[18] Sent by Pope John Paul II in June of 1994, Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, then president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (1984 to 1998), in a meeting with members of the clergy at a Junior Seminary in Butare, posed the following question: “Are you saying that the blood of tribalism is deeper than the waters of baptism?” Cf., Katongole, 2005a, p. 67, 69; Katongole, 2009, p. 22; Tumwebaze, 2010; Carney, 2011, p. 401.

[19] Under resolution L.31 (A/72/L.31), the United Nations General Assembly adopted the phrase “the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda” as the official historical title for the events of 1994 in Rwanda, replacing the previous verbiage of resolution 58/234 (A/RES/58/234) which posited the title as: “the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” Cf., International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, A/RES/58/234 (23 February 2004, 2004).

It should be noted that estimates on the number of Tutsis killed during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsis vary in range. According to the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG), a “national, independent, and permanent institution” established by the government of Rwanda in 2007, 1,070,014 Tutsi bodies have been recovered and documented by the government of Rwanda. Cf., The National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG), 2018.

[20] Cf., Katongole, 2005a, p. 68; Safari, 2010, p. 874. In the “Third Population and Housing Census – 2002” by the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, it was estimated that 94 percent of the population of Rwanda identified as Christian. Cf., Rutayisire, 2015, p. 16.

In his article, “Recent Developments in African Christianity” (1994), Paul Gifford states that: “The Catholic Church has the loosest method of all for assessing membership; any infant baptized is included in the overall figures, and they will stay there even if he or she never attends church, or even joins another [denomination]” (Gifford, 1994, p. 524). Statistics on Catholic Church membership prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi thus must be taken at face value, recognizing the limitations of parish baptism and membership records.

[21] Longman, 2001, p. 163; Cf. Safari, 2010, p. 874.

- [22] Cf., Katongole, 2005a, p. 68; Rutayisire, 2015, p. 16.
- [23] Safari, 2010, p. 876. Cf., Mamdani, 2001
- [24] Cf., Mamdani, 2001, p. 20.
- [25] Mamdani, 2001, p. 88.
- [26] Mamdani, 2001, p. 79
- [27] Mamdani, 2001, p. 24.
- [28] Mamdani, 2001, p. 26.
- [29] Storey, 2012, pp. 8, 11.
- [30] Mamdani, 2001, p. 29.
- [31] Wright Mills defines the “social imagination” as “the awareness of the relationship between personal experience and the wider society” (Mills, 1959, pp. 5, 7). Cf., Katongole, 2005a, 2005b, 2009.
- [32] United Nations, General Assembly, 1946.
- [33] United Nations, General Assembly, 1948.
- [34] Cf., Safari, 2010, p. 876; Carney, 2012a, p. 178. Other scholars like Van ‘T Spijker (1997), Longman (2001), Carney (2012b), Rutayisire (2015), and others state that the first missionaries to the present-day nation-state of Rwanda arrived in 1900.
- [35] Van ‘T Spijker, 1997, p. 239.

Tharcisse Gatwa, in his article, “Mission and Belgian Colonial Anthropology in Rwanda. Why the Churches Stood Accused in 1994? What Next?” (2000), states: “Father Marcel Pauwels (1963), Emmanuel Ntezimana (1990) and other historians [note that] Rwanda was not unified until the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The empire was made up of several small monarchies whose duration and size were subject to variance. There was a continuing but unsuccessful attempt in the central core of the monarchy to impose its model of hierarchical organization in the peripheral and satellite regions” (p. 5).

- [36] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 26.
- [37] Van 'T Spijker, 1997, p. 239.
- [38] Safari, 2010, p. 876. Rutayisire notes: "It is well known that the missionaries first met with fierce resistance and hostility from King Yuhi Musinga and their relationship remained tense until they managed to depose him in 1930, replacing him with one of his sons, King Mutara III Rudahigwa who had been trained in the first colonial administration school" (2015, p. 27).
- [39] Safari, 2010, p. 876. Cf., Van 'T Spijker, 1997; Rutayisire, 2015, p. 27.
- [40] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 27.
- [41] Carney, 2012a, p. 178; Gatwa, 2000, p. 9.
- [42] Gatwa, 2000, p. 9.
- [43] Longman, 2001, p. 168.
- [44] Gatwa, 2000, pp. 8, 10.
- [45] Gatwa, 2000, p. 10. Cf., Carney, 2012a, p. 179.
- [46] Cf., Van 'T Spijker, 1997, p. 240.
- [47] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 27.
- [48] Zimbardo, 2004, pp. 21, 23.
- [49] Zimbardo, 2004, p. 21.
- [50] Ndorimana, 2001, p. 115.
- [51] Ndorimana, 2001, pp. 8, 109.
- [52] Cf., Gourevitch, 1998; Mamdani, 2001.
- [53] Davidson, 1992, p. 26.

- [54] Katongole, 2009, p. 25.
- [55] Dorrien, 2001, p. 17.
- [56] Dorrien, 2001, p. 17.
- [57] Dorrien, 2001, p. 17.
- [58] Dorrien, 2001, p. 17. Cf., Dorrien, 2001, p. 18.
- [59] Dorrien, 2001, p. 17.
- [60] Rich, 2014, p. 2.
- [61] Rich, 2014, p. 2.
- [62] Zimbardo, 2004, pp. 21, 23.
- [63] Zimbardo, 2004, p. 21.
- [64] Rich, 2014, p. 2.
- [65] Katongole, 2005b, p. 150.
- [66] Safari, 2010, p. 876.
- [67] Gatwa, 2014, p. 317.
- [68] Cf., Safari, 2010, p. 876; Gatwa, 2014, pp. 316–7. Gatwa notes that poems such as “*umwami si umuntu* (the king is not an ordinary person), *imana nyibona mu inabiro* (I saw god throughout the palace), and *indi mana ni we uyizi* (the other god, it is only the King who is him)” gave concrete expression to this belief” (2014, p. 317). For the ordinary pre-colonial Rwandan, divinized kingship was best expressed in the phrase, “*irivuze umwami* (what the king says)” (Gatwa, 2014, p. 320). Rutayisire contends that the practice of monarchal divinization became fertile ground for cultural practice of “blind obedience and total submission” to the king (2015, p. 21). Cf., Rutayisire, 2015, p. 21.
- [69] Gatwa, 2014, p. 316.
- [70] Gatwa, 2014, p. 315–6.

- [71] Gatwa, 2014, p. 315.
- [72] Gatwa, 2014, p. 319.
- [73] Gatwa, 2014, p. 318.
- [74] Gatwa, 2014, p. 316.
- [75] Gatwa, 2014, p. 318.
- [76] Gatwa, 2014, p. 316.
- [77] Gatwa, 2014, p. 318.
- [78] Gatwa, 2014, p. 320.
- [79] Mamdani, 2001, p. 14.
- [80] Mamdani, 2001, pp. 20, 25.
- [81] Longman, 2001, p. 167.
- [82] Longman, 2001, p. 168.
- [83] Gatwa, 2000, p. 4.
- [84] Katongole, 2005a, p. 72.
- [85] Katongole, 2005a, p. 72.
- [86] Gatwa, 2000, p. 5.
- [87] Gatwa, 2000, p. 5.
- [88] Katongole, 2005a, p. 72.
- [89] Longman, 2001, p. 168.
- [90] Gatwa, 2000, p. 6.

[91] Gatwa, 2000, p. 6.

[92] Gatwa, 2000, p. 6.

[93] Cf., Carney 2012a, 2012b; Gatwa 2000; Longman, 2001; Katongole, 2005a, 2005b, 2009; Mamdani, 2001; Rutayisire, 2015; Safari, 2010; Van 't Spijiker, 1997.

[94] Carney, 2012a, pp. 174, 177; Gatwa, 2000, p. 5.

[95] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 25.

[96] Carney, 2012a, p. 178.

[97] Carney, 2012a, p. 174.

[98] Cf., Cargas, 2010; Carney 2012a, 2012b; Gatwa 2000; Longman, 2001; Rutayisire, 2015; Safari, 2010; Van 't Spijiker, 1997.

[99] Carney, 2012a, p. 179.

[100] Carney, 2012b, pp. 82-3.

[101] Carney, 2012b, p. 85.

[102] Carney, 2012b, p. 85.

[103] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 22.

[104] Rutayisire, 2015, pp. 19, 20.

[105] Gatwa, 2000, p. 8; Gifford, 1994, pp. 521-2.

[106] Gatwa, 2014, p. 321.

[107] Davidson, 1992, p. 10.

[108] Davidson, 1992, pp. 8, 13.

[109] Katongole, 2005a, p. 69.

- [110] Katongole, 2005a, p. 71.
- [111] Katongole, 2005a, p. 73; Davidson, 1992, p. 26.
- [112] Mamdani, 2001, p. 104; Carney, 2012a, p. 183.
- [113] Safari, 2010, p. 877.
- [114] Safari, 2010, p. 877.
- [115] Safari, 2010, p. 877.
- [116] Carney, 2012a, p. 184.
- [117] Carney, 2012a, p. 183.
- [118] Carney, 2012a, p. 184.
- [119] Katongole, 2005b, p. 155; Katongole, 2005a, p. 78.
- [120] Safari, 2010, p. 877.
- [121] Mamdani, 2001, p. 103–4.
- [122] Safari, 2010, p. 877; van ‘t Spijker, 1997, p. 242.
- [123] Safari, 2010, p. 877–8.
- [124] Mamdani, 2001, p. 29.
- [125] Appleby, 2000, p. 4.
- [126] Appleby, 2000, p. 4; Mamdani, 2001, p. 88.
- [127] Katongole, 2005b, p. 156.
- [128] Safari, 2010, p. 879. Safari notes that the “recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of students” and “staff, both lay and religious” were not the sole condition of the 1966 legislation, but one of four main provision, including the seizure of school property and the secular definition of course content (2010, p. 879).

[129] Safari, 2010, p. 879.

[130] Safari, 2010, p. 879.

[131] Safari, 2010, p. 880.

[132] ; Longman, 2001, p. 171.

[133] Gatwa, 2000, p. 14.

[134] Carney 2012a, p. 194.

[135] Riot, 2015, p. 941.

[136] Riot, 2015, pp. 943, 947.

[137] Riot, 2015, p. 944.

[138] Cargas, 2010, p. 1066.

[139] Longman, 2001, p. 180.

[140] Rutyaaisire, 2015, pp. 23-4.

[141] Davidson, 1992, p. 26.

[142] Katongole, 2005b, p. 149.

[143] Longman, 2001, p. 164.

[144] Longman, 2001, p. 179; Katongole, 2005b, p. 152.

[145] Katongole, 2005a, p. 68.

[146] Cargas, 2010, p. 1064.

[147] Katongole, 2005a, p. 68.

[148] “Inside Nyakibanda Seminary: How the Church is Moving On,” 2016. It should be noted that, in 2015, the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for



Rwanda (ICTR) issued charges against Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, stating that he had “conspired with leaders of the extremist Hutu militia,” helped to identify Tutsis for extermination, “stood by as Tutsis were taken away and killed, allowed the militia to roam his church hunting for victims,” and “raped young women” (Hiding in Plain Sight in France: The Priests Accused in Rwandan Genocide, 2014). Additionally, in 2015, “a military court in Rwanda convicted the priest in absentia and sentenced him to life in prison for genocide” (Hiding in Plain Sight in France: The Priests Accused in Rwandan Genocide, 2014). As of 2018, Munyeshyaka is pastor of a small Catholic Church in northern France, failing to be extradited to Rwanda by the government of France (Hiding in Plain Sight in France: The Priests Accused in Rwandan Genocide, 2014).

[149] “Inside Nyakibanda Seminary: How the Church is Moving on,” 2016.

[150] “Hiding in Plain Sight in France: The Priests Accused in Rwandan Genocide,” 2014.

[151] Longman, 2001, pp. 180, 166.

[152] Van ‘t Spijker, 1997, p. 247.

[153] Ndorimana, 2001, pp. 109, 149; Rutayisire, 2015, pp. 23–4.

[154] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.

[155] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.

[156] ID 004, personal communication, 30 April 2018.

[157] ID 005, personal communication, 03 May 2018.

[158] ID 001, personal communication, 23 April 2018.

[159] ID 001, personal communication, 23 April 2018.

[160] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.

[161] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.

[162] ID 004, personal communication, 30 April 2018.

- [163] ID 006, personal communication, 04 May 2018.
- [164] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.
- [165] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.
- [166] ID 006, personal communication, 04 May 2018.
- [167] ID 003, personal communication, 27 April 2018.
- [168] ID 004, personal communication, 30 April 2018.
- [169] ID 004, personal communication, 30 April 2018; ID 006, personal communication, 04 May 2018.
- [170] ID 001, personal communication, 23 April 2018.
- [171] ID 001, personal communication, 23 April 2018.
- [172] Katongole, 2005b, p. 147. Cf., Conrad, J. (1899). *Heart of Darkness*. New York: Global Classics.
- [173] Katongole, 2009, p. 25.
- [174] Katongole, 2008, pp. 25, 26; The Epistle to the Galatians 3:28, The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE).
- [175] The Acts of the Apostles 2:42–47, The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE). Complete text: They devoted themselves to the teaching of the apostles and to the communal life, to the breaking of the bread and to the prayers. Awe came upon everyone, and many wonders and signs were done through the apostles. All who believed were together and had all things in common; they would sell their property and possessions and divide them among all according to each one's need. Every day they devoted themselves to meeting together in the temple area and to breaking bread in their homes. They ate their meals with exultation and sincerity of heart, praising God and enjoying favor with all the people. And every day the Lord added to their number those who were being saved."
- [176] Katongole, 2009, pp. 52–3.

[177] Longman, 2001, pp. 164, 168.

[178] Appleby, 2000, p. 1. Here, it should be stated that “the modern West” refers to the political structures of influenced by Enlightenment philosophy (1685–1815).

[179] Appleby, 2000, p. 4.

[180] Katongole, 2005b, p. 156.

[181] Katongole, 2005b, p. 156; Appleby, 2000, p. 9.

[182] Katognole, 2009, p. 75

[183] Katongole, 2009, p. 75.

[184] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 20.

[185] Carney, 2012a, pp. 174, 177.

[186] ID 004, personal communication, 30 April 2018; ID 006, personal communication, 04 May 2018; ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.

[187] ID 006, personal communication, 04 May 2018.

[188] Longman, 2001, p. 166; Ndorimana, 2001, p. 115.

[189] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.

[190] Cf., Carney 2012a, 2012b; Gatwa 2000; Longman, 2001; Katongole, 2005a, 2005b, 2009; Mamdani, 2001; Rutayisire, 2015; Safari, 2010; Van ‘t Spijiker, 1997.

[191] Cf., The Epistle to the Galatians 3:28, The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE); The Epistle to the Galatians 3:28, The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE). The term “the Dark Continent” was coined by H.M. Stanley in his book *Through the Dark Continent* (1878).

[192] Gatwa, 2000, p. 4; Katognole, 2009, p. 69.

[193] Francis, 2018, s. 29.

- [194] Francis, 2015, intro., s. 1.
- [195] Francis, 2015, intro.
- [196] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.
- [197] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.
- [198] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.
- [199] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.
- [200] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 19.
- [201] Rutayisire, 2015, p. 23.
- [202] Gifford, 1994, p. 517.
- [203] Gifford, 1994, p. 517.
- [204] Francis, 2015, intro.; Gifford, 1994, p. 517; The Gospel of Matthew 28:19–20, The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE); Cf., Katongole, 2005, p. 68.
- [205] Francis, 2015, intro.
- [206] Van ‘t Spijker, 1997, pp. 253, 248.
- [207] Katongole, 2009, p. 104.
- [208] Katongole, 2009, p. 105.
- [209] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018; ID 004, personal communication, 30 April 2018.
- [210] ID 004, personal communication, 30 April 2018.
- [211] Katongole, 2009, p. 37.
- [212] ID 002, personal communication, 25 April 2018.

- [213] ID 003, personal communication, 27 April 2018.
- [214] Longman, 2001, p. 166.
- [215] ID 003, personal communication, 27 April 2018.
- [216] ID 003, personal communication, 27 April 2018.
- [217] ID 003, personal communication, 27 April 2018.
- [218] ID 003, personal communication, 27 April 2018.
- [219] “Inside Nyakibanda Seminary: How the Church is Moving on,” 2016.
- [220] “Hiding in Plain Sight in France: The Priests Accused in Rwandan Genocide,” 2014.
- [221] Longman, 2001, p. 180.
- [222] Longman, 2001, p. 180.
- [223] Katongole, 2005b, p. 147. Cf., Conrad, J. (1899). *Heart of Darkness*. New York: Global Classics.
- [224] Cargas, 2010, p. 1064.
- [225] Francis, 2018, s. 41.
- [226] Francis, 2018, ss. 40-2, 47, 58.
- [227] Francis, 2018, s. 57.
- [228] ID 001, personal communication, 23 April 2018.
- [229] ID 004, personal communication, 30 April 2018.
- [230] The Epistle to the Galatians 3:28, The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE).
- [231] John Paul II, 1995, s. 13.

[231] Katongole, 2005a, p. 70.

[232] Appleby, 2000, p. 9.

[233] Gatwa, 2003, p. 193



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- [1] Appleby, S. R. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- [2] Cargas, S. (2010). [Review of the book *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*, by T. Longman]. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 32(4), 1063–1068. DOI: 10.1353/hrq.2010.0014.
- [3] Carney, J. (2011). *From Democratization to Ethnic Revolution: Catholic Politics in Rwanda, 1950–1962* (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from: ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global (Order No. 3454690).
- [4] Carney, J. (2012a). Beyond Tribalism: The Hutu–Tutsi Question and Catholic Rhetoric in Colonial Rwanda. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 42(2), 172–202. DOI: 10.1163/157006612X646178.
- [5] Carney, J. (2012b). ‘Far from having unity, we are tending towards total disunity’: The Catholic Major Seminary in Rwanda, 1950–62. *Studies in World Christianity*, 18(1), 82–102. DOI: 10.3366/swc.2012.0007.
- [6] Davidson, B. (1992). *The Black Man’s Burden: African and the Curse of the Nation–State*. New York: Times Books.
- [7] Dorrien, G (2001). The Origins of Postliberalism: A Third Way in Theology? *Christian Century*, 118(20), 16–21. Retrieved from: [http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/ps/i.do?ty=as&v=2.1&u=nd\\_ref&it=DI&url&s=RELEVANCE&p=EAIM&q=SN~0009-5281~~VO~118~~SP~16~~IU~20&lm=DA~120010000&sw=w/\(ISSN\): 0009-5281](http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/ps/i.do?ty=as&v=2.1&u=nd_ref&it=DI&url&s=RELEVANCE&p=EAIM&q=SN~0009-5281~~VO~118~~SP~16~~IU~20&lm=DA~120010000&sw=w/(ISSN): 0009-5281)).
- [8] Francis (2018). *Gaudete et Exsultate*. Retrieved from: [http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost\\_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco\\_esortazione-ap\\_20180319\\_gaudete-et-exsultate.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20180319_gaudete-et-exsultate.html).
- [9] Francis (2015). “‘Make Your Hearts Firm’ (James 5:8).” Retrieved from: [https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/lent/documents/papa-francesco\\_20141004\\_messaggio-quaresima2015.html](https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/lent/documents/papa-francesco_20141004_messaggio-quaresima2015.html).



- [10] Gatwa, T. (2000). Mission and Belgian Colonial Anthropology in Rwanda. Why Churches Stood Accused in the 1994 Tragedy? What Next? *Studies in World Christianity*, 6(1), 1–20. DOI: 10.3366/swc.2000.6.1.1.
- [11] Gatwa, T. (2003). Theological Education in Africa: What Prospects for Sharing Knowledge? *Exchange*, 32(3), 193–213. DOI: 10.1163/157254303X00019.
- [12] Gatwa, T. (2014). God in the Public Domain: Life Giver, Protector, or Indifferent Sleeper during the Rwandan Tragedies. *Exchange*, 43(4), 313–338. DOI: 10.1163/1572543X-12341335.
- [13] Gifford, P. (1994). Some Recent Developments in African Christianity. *African Affairs*, 93(373), 513–534. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a098757.
- [14] Gourevitch, P. (1998). *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*. New York: Picador.
- [15] John Paul II (1995). *Ecclesia in Africa*. Retrieved from: [http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost\\_exhortations/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_exh\\_14091995\\_ecclesia-in-africa.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_14091995_ecclesia-in-africa.html).
- [16] Katongole, E. (2005a). Christianity, Tribalism, and the Rwandan Genocide: A Catholic Reassessment of Christian “Social Responsibility.” *Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture*, 8(3), 67–93. DOI: 10.1353/log.2005.0027.
- [17] Katongole, E. (2005b). Violence and Social Imagination: Rethinking Theology and Politics in Africa. *Religion and Theology*, 12(2), 145–171. DOI: 10.1163/157430105X00031.
- [18] Katongole, E., & Wilson-Hartgrove, J. (2009). *Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
- [19] Longman, T. (2001). Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 31(2), 163–186. DOI: 10.1163/157006601X00112.
- [20] Mamdani, Mahmood (2001). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- [21] McGreal, C. (2014). Hiding in Plain Sight in France: the Priests Accused in Rwandan Genocide. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/07/rwanda-genocide-20-years-priests-catholic-church>.
- [22] Ndurimana, Jean (2001). *Rwanda: L'Eglise Catholique dans le Malaise: Symptomes et Temoignages*. Roma: Edizioni Vivere In.
- [23] Rich, R. (2014). Storied Identities: Identity Formation and Life Story. *University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History*, 15, 1-16. Retrieved from: <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=storied-identities.pdf&site=15>.
- [24] Riot, T. (2015). A Roundabout Revolution: Rethinking the Decolonization of Rwanda by the Practices of the Catholic Scouting Movement, 1954-1964. *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 32(7), 939-951. DOI: 10.1080/09523367.2015.1044299.
- [25] Rutayisire, A. (2015). *Designing a Model of Leadership Development for Missional Pastors in the Anglican Church of Rwanda* (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global (Order No. 3706442).
- [26] Safari, P. (2010). Church, State, and the Rwandan Genocide. *Political Theology*, 11(6), 873-893. DOI: 10.1558/poth.v11i6.873.
- [27] Storey, A. (2012). Structural Violence and the Struggle for State Power in Rwanda: What Arusha Got Wrong. *African Journal for Conflict Resolution*, 12(3), 7-32. Retrieved from: [https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/\(ISSN\):1562-6997](https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/(ISSN):1562-6997).
- [28] Thasiah, V. (2017). Prophetic Pedagogy: Critically Engaging Public Officials in Rwanda. *Studies in World Christianity*, 23(3), 257-280. DOI:10.3366/swc.2017.0195.
- [29] The National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG) (2018). Retrieved from: <http://cnlg.gov.rw/about-us/overview/?L=0>.
- [30] Tumwebaze, P. (2010). *Cardinal Roger Etchegaray and Bloody Symbolism*. Retrieved from: <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/24202>.
- [31] Tumwebaze, P. (2016). *Inside Nyakibanda Seminary: How the Church is Moving On*. Retrieved from: <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/199003>.

[32] United Nations, General Assembly (1946). *The Crime of Genocide, A/RES/96-I (11 December 1946)*. Retrieved from: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/47/IMG/NR003347.pdf?OpenElement>

[33] United Nations, General Assembly (1948). *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, A/RES/260 (9 December 1948)*. Retrieved from: [http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1\\_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf).

[34] United Nations, General Assembly (2004). *International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, A/RES/58/234 (23 February 2004)*. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/58/234>.

[35] United Nations, General Assembly (2017). *International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, A/72/L.31 (12 December 2017)*. Retrieved from: <http://undocs.org/A/72/L.31>.

[36] Van 't Spijker, G. (1997). The Churches and Genocide in Rwanda. *Exchange*, 26(3), 233–255. DOI: 10.1163/157254397X00421.

[37] Wright Mills, C. (1959). *The Sociological Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[38] Zimbardo, P. G. (2004). “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators.” In A.G. Miller (Ed.) *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil* (pp. 21–50). New York: Guilford Press.

## APPENDIX A

[A1] What is your name?

[A2] Where were you born? In what year?

[A3] What is your current occupation?

[A4] Are you a Catholic? If so, how often do you attend Sunday mass?

[A5] Are you married? If so, is your spouse Catholic?

[A6] Do you have children? If so, how many? Do they attend Sunday mass?

[A7] Are you a member of the clergy? If so, when were you ordained to the priesthood? What seminary did you attend?

[A8] How were you introduced to the Catholic faith? By whom?

[A9] How were you educated in the Catholic faith? By whom?

[A10] Could you describe how the Catholic faith was taught to you?

[A11] What key messages were repeatedly emphasized?

[A12] What did these messages – and the way they were taught – teach you about what it meant to be a “good” Catholic?

[A13] What did these messages – and the way they were taught – teach you about what – and who – you were to value as a Catholic?

[A14] What did these messages – and the way they were taught – teach you about how you were to act, as a Catholic, with others similar to – and different from – you such as Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas?

[A15] What did these messages – and the way they were taught – teach you about what you were to stand up for – and against – as a Catholic in your community and nation–state?

[A16] If a member of the clergy, could you describe seminary education? What messages did the seminary promote prior to and during the 1994 Genocide

against the Tutsi in Rwanda? What attitudes were present at the seminary before or during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi?

[A17]If a member of the clergy, what actions did priests or seminary educators take prior to and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi?

[A18]Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, what do you remember as key ideas or themes that priests preached about at mass?

[A19]Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, how would you describe the attitudes and actions priests promoted from the pulpit? Could you offer an example?

[A20]Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, how did what you heard at Sunday mass inform your daily life – at work, home, and in your community?

[A21]Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, what do you remember about the role and influence of the Church?

[A22]Prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, do you recall priests speaking out against genocide ideology in Rwanda? If so, what did they say?

[A23]If a member of the clergy, what do you remember as key ideas or themes that you preached about at mass prior to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi? How would you describe the attitudes and actions you promoted from the pulpit? Could you offer an example?

[A24]If a member of the clergy, did you speak out against the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda? If you did, what did you say? How, if at all, did your preaching affect your attitudes and actions?

[A25]During the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, could you describe the relationship between the Church and the government of Rwanda? What was the balance between religious and political identity among clergymen and churchgoers?

[A26]Do you see any difference between the pre-genocide Church and the Church of today? If so, what are the two to three major changes you see? If not, what remains the same?

[A27]How did the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda affect your Catholic faith, especially your faith in the Catholic Church and its leaders?

## APPENDIX B

	AGE	SEX	LOCALITY	RELATION TO TOPIC	LANGUAGE OF INTERVIEW	INTERPRETER	RECORDED
ID 001	44/45	M	UGANDA (BEFORE 1994); RWANDA (PRESENTLY LIVING IN KIGALI)	PERSONAL	ENGLISH	NO	YES
ID 002	60/61	M	RWANDA (BORN IN E. PROVINCE; PRESENTLY LIVING IN KIGALI)	PERSONAL	ENGLISH	NO	YES
ID 003	50/51	F	RWANDA (LOCATION OF BIRTH UNKNOWN; PRESENTLY LIVING IN KIGALI)	PERSONAL	ENGLISH	NO	YES
ID 004	41/42	M	RWANDA (BORN IN S. PROVINCE; PRESENTLY LIVING IN KIGALI)	PERSONAL	ENGLISH	NO	NO
ID 005	49/50	F	RWANDA (BORN IN E. PROVINCE; PRESENTLY LIVING IN KIGALI)	PERSONAL	KINYARWANDA	YES	NO
ID 006	53/54	M	UGANDA (BEFORE 1995); RWANDA (PRESENTLY LIVING IN BUTARE)	PERSONAL	ENGLISH	NO	YES

## APPENDIX C

	CATHOLIC FROM BIRTH	CURRENTLY CATHOLIC	INTRODUCED BY WHOM	PRIMARY RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE	MEMBER OF CLERGY	ATTENDED CATHOLIC SCHOOL
ID 001	YES	YES	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	NO	YES (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL)
ID 002	YES	NO (ANGLICAN SINCE 1990)	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	NONE	NO	YES (PRIMARY SCHOOL AND MINOR SEMINARY)
ID 003	YES	YES	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	PARENTS (SPECIFICALLY HER MOTHER)	NO	YES (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL)
ID 004	YES	NO (ANGLICAN SINCE 2013)	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	NO (PREVIOUSLY A CATHOLIC PRIEST; 2004-2013)	YES (PRIMARY, MINOR SEMINARY, MAJOR SEMINARY)
ID 005	YES	YES	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	NO	YES (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL)
ID 006	YES	YES	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	PARENTS; PARISH PRIEST(S); PARISH CATECHIST(S); SCHOOL TEACHER(S)	YES (SINCE 1997)	YES (PRIMARY, MINOR SEMINARY, MAJOR SEMINARY)